

WILL THE ADDITION OF THE BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE
TO THE OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM PREPARE BETTER
SMALL-UNIT LEADERS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

WILL THE ADDITION OF THE BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE TO THE OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM PREPARE BETTER SMALL-UNIT LEADERS by MAJ Thomas D. Boccardi, USA, 88 pages.

This study examines how the Officer Education System (OES) prepares small-unit leaders. The research design for this thesis proposes to answer the overarching question: Does the addition of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) produce better small-unit leaders than the current OES? To analyze the over-arching question, the subordinate questions were developed to focus the analysis of available literature, define criteria for evaluation, select the data within each criterion, evaluate the data, and to examine the results.

The criteria for evaluation was the Leadership Framework (Be, Know, Do) as defined by FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. Be represents the Army Values and leader attributes, Know represent the technical and tactical skills, and Do represents the leader-actions. Programs of instruction from the precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBCs) provided the data for evaluation, ultimately comparing the results with and without the addition of BOLC.

These results were intended to provide recommendations for the problem identified by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP): “Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations” (ATLDP, OS-5, 2000).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
FIGURES	v
TABLES	vi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	11
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	24
4. ANALYSIS	30
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	59
APPENDIX	
A. MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS II.....	64
B. PRECOMMISSIONING SOURCE COMMON CORE	68
C. OFFICER BASIC COURSE COMMON CORE	70
D. TC 440 SURVEY.....	72
E. SKILLS AND ACTIONS.....	78
REFERENCE LIST	80
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	86
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT.....	87

FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations.....	16
2. Leadership Framework	18

TABLES

Table	Page
1. Army Values and Leader Attributes	31
2. Methods of Instruction.....	34
3. Methods of Performance Oriented Instruction	35
4. Types of Exercises	36
5. Army Values and Leader Attributes Task Training	37
6. Performance Oriented Army Values and Leader Attributes Task Training....	38
7. Technical Skills.....	39
8. Tactical Skills	40
9. Leader-actions	42
10. Precommissioning Source Values Task Training	44
11. Precommissioning Source Technical Task Training.....	44
12. Precommissioning Source Tactical Task Training.....	45
13. Precommissioning Source Leader-actions Task Training.....	45
14. Officer Basic Course Values Task Training.....	46
15. Officer Basic Course Technical Task Training.....	47
16. Officer Basic Course Tactical Task Training.....	48
17. Officer Basic Course Leader-actions Task Training	48
18. Basic Officer Leader Course Task Training.....	54

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force, and we grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers. Our soldiers provide back to America a corps of leaders who have a tremendous work ethic, who have a strong sense of values, who treat others with dignity and respect, who are accustomed to hard work, who are courageous, who thrive on responsibility, who know how to build and motivate teams, and who are positive role models for all around them. We provide this opportunity to American youth so that we can keep our Nation strong and competitive, and enable it to fulfill its leadership role in the community of nations. We invest today in the Nation's leadership for tomorrow. (Shinseki 1999, 7)

Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki

Background

This study examines how the Officer Education System (OES) prepares lieutenants for their first unit of assignment and its effectiveness in producing competent and confident Small-unit leaders. It will conduct a comparison analysis between the current OES and the OES with the addition of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). The criteria used will be the Army Leadership Framework (Be, Know, Do) as defined by FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. The purpose of this research is to find if the BOLC task training substantiates its mission then link the findings to the thesis.

Transformation in the OES is a reoccurring event throughout the history of the Army. As the Army transforms its mission and technology to meet future challenges, it then changes the way it trains officers. The Army directs surveys to provide findings and give recommendations to improve the OES. Since the Vietnam War, the OES has undergone five major studies: Officer Professional Management System (OPMS 1973), Review of the Education and Training of Officers (RETO 1978), Professional

Development of Officers Study (PDOS 1985), Leadership Development Study (LDS, 1987), and most recently, Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel (ATLDP 2000).

The purpose of the Officer Professional Management System study was to address the problems in the Army due to social crisis, societal ostracism, racial strife, and widespread drug use. “The Army’s senior leadership believed the Vietnam War revealed a crisis in the officer corps. Many lacked the leadership qualities to deal with the Army’s ills” (CAC 1994, C-2). The Officer Professional Management System continues to successfully review and update the officer personnel system to ensure it remains responsive to evolving needs and future challenges.

The Review of the Education and Training of Officers study was a defining event in the Army’s view on leader development (CGSC 1983). It yielded the Military Qualification Standards (MQS) which standardized criteria for commissioning among the commissioning sources. This program made mandatory teaching of common military skills and knowledge prior to commissioning and served to standardize officer training throughout the Army (Chapman et al., 1998).

The lack of common standards for commissioning has created problems within the Army for years. Basic course learning becomes highly inefficient when it must be structured to fit the lowest common denominator of skills from among widely varying sources of commission, e.g., United States Military Academy (USMA), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and 280 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments. The Military Qualification Standards (MQS) make mandatory for all commissioning sources the teaching of common military skills and knowledge before commissioning. (RETO 1978, C-2)

In the mid-1980s, the Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickam Jr. directed the Professional Development of Officers Study to “reexamine all aspects of the officer professional development system as it has evolved since the 1978 Review of the

Education and Training of Officers study and to project the applicability of that system and our recommendations out to 2025” (PDOS 1985, 23-25). The Professional Development of Officers Study noted the OES “must be transitioned to an education and training strategy which will more effectively meet tomorrow’s challenges” (PDOS 1985, 22). The Professional Development of Officers Study noted significant challenges in officer basic education skills, lack of standardization among Officer Basic Courses (OBC), to include a lack of focus on combat action and warfighting in officer education and training. The Professional Development of Officers Study conclusions were to institute a “Common Core of skills, knowledge and proficiencies across all OBCs” (PDOS, 1985, 23-25,59).

Led by Major General Gordon Sullivan, the Leadership Development Study focused on standards in leadership training.

The need to clearly articulate and consistently enforce Army-wide standards and goals upon which leader development efforts can be based and leaders can be developed. This theme emphasized the need for a common understanding throughout the Army of the battlefield requirements placed on our leaders at all levels. (LDS 1987, 15)

Its focus centered on instituting a program for common leadership instruction throughout the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school system, specifically the shortcomings among the OBCs. OBCs dedicated only ten hours of instruction to leadership, emphasizing technical skills, not the “leadership skills the lieutenant must bring with him to his unit” (CGSC 1994, C-2). A common OBC curriculum was created for TRADOC. Subsequently, OBCs incorporated specific competencies that every lieutenant will need into their instruction.

Despite these major changes, the basic structure and methods of the OES have not appreciably changed since the end of the Cold War (ATLDP 2000, OS-05). Its structure is a two-phased process consisting of a precommissioning source education followed by a branch-specific OBC. Precommissioning can be done in one of three methods: United States Military Academy (USMA or West Point), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Precommissioning programs have varied curricula and follow different policy guidance and regulations for precommissioning task requirements. In addition to varied precommissioning curricula, each basic branch school commandant is responsible for identifying and training branch specific requirements at OBC (DA PAM 600-3 1997).

In June 2000, the Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki chartered a panel that compiled and analyzed data from more than 13,500 soldiers in sixty-one locations worldwide, using comprehensive surveys, focus group interviews, personal interviews, and independent research. This panel was known as the Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel (ATLDP), and it concluded that the OES was not providing officers the basic combat skills necessary to lead and protect their units in full-spectrum operations. FM 3-0 defines full-spectrum operations as the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war (FM 3-0 2001,1-4). Technical and tactical skill proficiency is a readily identifiable issue with lieutenants and their supervisors. Less than one-third of the lieutenants believed that their Officer Basic Courses prepared them for combined arms operations and less than 10 percent of officers who supervise lieutenants rated lieutenant competencies positively (ATLDP 2000). The ATDLDP indicates that early in the OES a disparity in tactical and technical skills exists

between lieutenants from the three commissioning sources. More problems exist regarding qualitative developmental experience for lieutenants in early assignments. Senior leaders in Regular Army Divisions commented on their inability to retain branch-qualified captains in staff positions, thus requiring lieutenants to backfill the vacancies.

To alleviate this problem, the Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel (ATLDP) recommended that the OES transform by developing a new two-phased Officer Basic Course for lieutenants. The first phase is an initial entry course that provides basic Small-unit combat training to all lieutenants. This course focuses on achieving a common Army standard for small-unit fighting, leadership, and skills. This course became known as the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC). The second phase consists of the branch proponent schools providing branch-specific technical and tactical skills. The intended endstate is a lieutenant who has a common bond with his Army peers, is a competent and confident small-unit leader, and is ready to assume leadership positions in the Army.

Scope and Delimitations

As defined by Army Regulation 351-1, *Individual Military Education and Training*, the collective mission of the precommissioning source and the basic course is to prepare “officers for their first duty assignment at the section or platoon level” (AR 351-1 1987, 3-2). The officers referred to in this text are lieutenants. It is important to delineate a lieutenant as a newly commissioned officer and as an officer prepared for his first duty assignment. Since all lieutenants do not lead platoons at their first duty assignment, it is not effective to use the term “platoon leader” when referring to a lieutenant. This study will use the term “small-unit leader” when referring to a lieutenant

who is prepared for his first duty assignment. Similarly, a captain or company commander is defined differently by rank or duty description.

To examine the effectiveness of the OES in preparation of small-unit leaders, this study will utilize the Army's Leadership Framework (Be, Know, Do) as the evaluation criteria. The "Be" represents instilling the Army values. The values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Despite the inclusion of mental, physical, and emotional attributes as part of the "Be" in the leadership framework, they are not used in the evaluation criteria. The "Know" represents the skills needed in combat. These skills are the technical and tactical competencies needed while in direct leadership of a section or platoon. Despite the inclusion of interpersonal and conceptual skills as part of the "Know" in the leadership framework, they are not used in the evaluation criteria. The "Do" represents the actions needed for successful leadership. These actions are influencing, operating, and improving. While each of these actions is further categorized into additional three sub-components, it is ineffective to measure nine categories for actions. A measurable standard for evaluating the effectiveness of OES preparation of a small-unit leader-action's is practical experience (FM 22-100 1999,1-2).

This study analyzes the current OES precommissioning and branch specific task training, notably how it is organized, linked, and executed from start to finish by reviewing the current Programs of Instruction (POIs) of ROTC, USMA, OCS and three selected OBCs. The sampling of OBCs consists of Combat Arms (Field Artillery), Combat Support Arms (Military Intelligence) and Combat Service Support Arms (Transportation Corps). This sampling selection provides a comparison of task training among all OBCs. The comparisons are not meant to prove a better POI amongst the

precommissioning sources and OBCs, but to identify trends, gaps, constraints, and redundancy within all POIs. Furthermore, the evaluation of cost analysis or cost effectiveness of training will not be included as a criterion.

To answer overarching question, this study conducts a comparison analysis of the current OES and the OES with the addition of the BOLC POI. This comparison is not meant to prove failure or non-compliance with Army directives among any component of the OES, nor will it try to quantify the amount of training hours needed to validate a successful officer. Finally, no conclusions will be made regarding the born versus bred argument in leadership development.

Limitations

Unlike Officer Basic Course (OBC) Programs of Instruction (POIs) that are governed by TRADOC regulations no standard exists for precommissioning source POIs. Due to the absence of standardization, a limitation exists in the ability to effectively account for task training before commissioning. In order to account for task training hours, this research will source summaries of task training and training schedules in order to account for hours in course instruction, practical exercise and field training.

Importance

The importance of this thesis directly relates to the Army's future success. In effect, this thesis will validate the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel (ATLDP), paying special attention to its recommendations. The research audience is branch school commandants.

Definition of Key Terms

Be. Character describes a person's inner strength, the Be of Be, Know, Do.

Character helps one know what is right; more than that, it links that knowledge to action.

Embracing Army values and developing leader attributes and living them until they become a habit (FM 22-100, 1999, 1-3).

BOLC Officer. An officer who participated in one of the four United States Army Infantry Command pilot programs.

Combat Arms (CA). Branches of the Army that is directly involved in the conduct of actual fighting. They are Infantry, Field Artillery, Aviation, Armor, and Engineers (DA PAM 600-3 1997, 8-2).

Combat Service Support (CSS). Branches of the Army primarily concerned with providing combat service support and or administration to the Army as a whole. They are Adjutant General, Finance, Quartermaster, Army Medical Department, Chaplains, Judge Advocate General, Ordnance, and Transportation (DA PAM 600-3 1997, 8-2).

Combat Support (CS). Branch of the Army that provides operational assistance to the CA. They are Air Defense Artillery, Signal Corps, Chemical, Military Police, and Military Intelligence (DA PAM 1997, 8-2).

Do. Leader actions are the Do of Army Leadership Doctrine. They include influencing, operating, and improving (FM 22-100 1999, 1-28).

Doctrine. An Army's fundamental doctrine is the condensed expression of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements (FM 3-0 2001, 1-3).

Evaluation. A subjective determination of a skill or competence against a perceived standard; measure of past or present performance (Merriam-Webster 2003).

Internalization. The incorporation of values or patterns of culture within the self as conscious or subconscious guiding principles through learning or socialization (Merriam-Webster 2003).

Know. A leader must have a certain level of knowledge to be competent. That knowledge is spread across four skill domains (Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical, and Tactical). Technical is how to use equipment and tactical is the ability to make a right decision concerning employment of units in combat (FM 22-100 1999, 1-25).

Leader Development. The three pillars of leader development, institutional training, operational assignments and self-development, define and engage a continuous cycle of selection, education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, reinforcement and evaluation. Learning, experience and feedback provide the basis for professional growth. Throughout their Army careers, leaders develop steadily and carefully as this cycle repeats in a logical, progressive and continuous sequence (DA PAM 600-3 1997, 2-1).

Leadership. Leadership is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (FM 22-100 1999, 1-1)

Legacy Officer. A due course officer that attends a precommissioning source and follow-on OBC.

Military Qualification Standards System (MQS). A professional development system for officers in which the Army school system, the unit commander, and the individual officer share responsibility (STP 21-II-MQS 1991, 1-1).

Officer Foundation Standards (OFS). A TRADOC program that revised the MQS. Besides focusing on the institutional pillar of leader development, OFS would become TRADOC's mechanism for managing all common training within the Officer Education System, by combining the MQS common core curriculum with the Common Military Training (CMT) into one consolidated curriculum (Chapman et al., 1998).

Skills. A compilation of individual tasks which have been acquired and developed to a level of competence; a learned power of doing something competently; the ability to use one's knowledge effectively (Merriam-Webster 2003; FM 22-100 1999, 1-5).

Small-unit leader. A face-to-face, first-line leader. Leadership takes place in those organizations where subordinates are used to seeing their leaders all the time: teams, squads, sections, and platoon or equivalent. This leader's span of influence, those he can reach out and touch, may range from a handful of people to hundreds (FM 22-100 1999, 5-124).

Warrior Ethos. This ethos is embodied in the desire to win the nation's wars despite every adversity. It is the will to win with honor, refusal to accept failure, and unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right (FM 22-100 1999, 2-85).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The current state of literature concerning the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) program is relatively minor. The literature found summarizes the context of the program and its impetus from the Army Training and Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) findings and recommendations. Due to BOLC's infancy, insufficient works indicate intellectual views on this subject, however a significant body of literature exists regarding the Army Officer Education System (OES) and this study's evaluation criteria, the Army Leadership Framework (Be, Know, Do). Initial research indicates sufficient literature exists regarding the historical context of the OES, doctrinal references, and military professional theory regarding the expectations of small-unit leaders.

This review partitions into three source categories: historical works, doctrinal references, and military professional theory. It will discuss the evolution of the OES with historical studies, then define the Army's expectations of a small-unit leader utilizing doctrinal field manuals and publications, finally, it will convey evolving theory regarding future of small-unit leaders.

The significant historical works are a chronological compilation of directed studies by the Army's leadership regarding the readiness of the officer corps. The focus of these studies was the training and education of the officer corps. The impetus of these historical studies was the *Officer Professional Management System* (OPMS) study in 1973. This study is the foundation of how officers are trained and managed. The review of historical studies is limited from 1973 to present, however each study provides

extensive detail to the changes in education and training of officers from precommissioning through Officer Basic Course to their first unit of assignment.

The 1978 *Review of the Education and Training of Officers Study* (RETO) was a defining event in the Army's view on leader development (CGSC, 1983). It identified a lack of common standards for the commissioning of officers and the inefficiency of basic course instruction. The RETO found all precommissioning programs of instruction (POIs) to be widely diverse. In the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), only the 6-week Summer Camp provides standard education and training of future officers. The POIs varied due to an emphasis in recruiting and retention in ROTC programs. The most significant product was the establishment of one standard for training junior officers-the Military Qualification Standards (MQS). The MQS was a comprehensive task list that directed the teaching of common military skills and knowledge training prior to commissioning for the United States Military Academy (USMA), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and all 280 ROTC detachments. Under the MQS system, all future officers in the precommissioning sources would operate under the MQS I task list and basic course officers through three years active commissioned serves would serve under MQS II. Projected but never published was MQS III for captains. The MQS divided into two components: military skills/knowledge and professional military education. The military skills directed officers to future specialty, however many skills were common among all branches. The professional military education consisted on a broader scope of knowledge, skill, and insight that would continue through an officer's career. In review of the RETO's notional model for MQS, the military skills/knowledge component categorized into five categories: Army organizational orientation, field craft, small-unit

tactics, equipment skills, and leadership. This component in the MQS dictates detailed tasks for land navigation, operating as a member or a leader of a fire team in and out of enemy contact, qualification with a rifle and familiarization with a pistol, machine gun and grenade launcher. Most notably, the leadership category detailed twelve tasks, of which, only one - “counsel subordinates effectively,” serves as a direct level/small group leader task. The remaining twelve tasks connote leading at an organizational level. Indicated later in this review, Army’s current doctrine on leadership indicates three levels of leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic. Current doctrine focuses junior officers in the direct leadership level. Despite RETO's emphasis on precommissioning, it is important to this study's research to identify the problems within the OES and the implemented standards utilized to repair (RETO 1978, ii; CGSC 1993, FM 22-100 1999, 4-55).

The 1985 *Professional Development of Officer* (PDOS) identified significant challenges to the OES, specifically the Officer Basic Courses (OBCs). The PDOS charter was to reexamine the OES as it evolved from the RETO, more importantly, project the applicability of the OES out to 2025, however they found significant challenges in the standardization of training between the OBCs (PDOS 1985, 1-1). Yet again, the common theme of standardization is identified as a problem in the OES. By restructuring the OBC course lengths to twenty weeks, each OBC POI was enabled to provide a mix of training and education in leadership, ethics, tactics, training of soldiers, equipment maintenance, and logistics. The PDOS identifies a “frame of reference” for the developmental period of lieutenant. This frame of reference is characterized as “Be, Know, Do.” “Be” indicates the internalization of officer values and the experience to handle physical and mental

stress. “Know” indicates experience of skills and doctrine. Nested into these skills is the MQS I task list. “Do” indicates the application of their leadership skills. In addition, the PDOS provides reference to standardizing common core tasks training in all OBC POIs.

Another historical study that structured junior officer development was the 1987 *Leadership Development Study* (LDS) led by Major General Gordon Sullivan. This study focused on instituting a program for common leadership instruction throughout the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school system, specifically amongst the OBCs. An emerging theme throughout this study was the enforcement of Army-wide standards and goals for leader development.

The need to clearly articulate and consistently enforce Army-wide standards and goals upon which leader development efforts can be based and leaders can be developed. Closely linked to the need for a common understanding throughout the Army of the battlefield requirements placed on our leaders at all levels. Without a common set of standards and goals, it is impossible to integrate all the leader development requirements to achieve the desired results (LDS, 1987, 15)

The LDS recommends three aims: establish common leadership doctrine standards for evaluation, implement a training structure that develops technical and tactical competency, and implement a system to sustain leader development into the future. These recommendations gave birth to individual and collective leader tasks as well as identifying shortfalls of training hours among the OES.

The historical study most necessary to this work is the 2000 *Army Training and Leader Development (Officer) Panel* (ATLDP). Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki addressed the significance of this study findings in a January 2002 Memorandum to the Army.

As part of a comprehensive review of our “people systems”, we initiated an Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) in June 2000 to review, assess and provide recommendations for the development of 21st Century leaders for a Transforming Army. The panel members surveyed nearly 14,000 officers, NCOs and civilians who told them we have work to do in four areas to achieve The Army Vision of a trained and ready force able to respond to 21st Century challenges: Army Culture, Army Training, Leader Development and Management and Feedback. The survey results indicate that we need to adjust our culture, get back to our roots in training, improve officer leader development and management, and establish a healthy feedback to inform the force and make adjustments where necessary. The panel found disconnects between what we as an Army believe and what we do in practice. (Shinseki Memorandum, 2002)

The ATLDP provides this study’s problem in its findings and provides the recommendation of transforming the OES into a two-phased OBC, in which the first course is Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) and the proponent OBC is the follow-on course. Specific findings (Figure 1) among those surveyed in the ATLDP identified shortcomings among Army lieutenant's technical and tactical skills. A relatively low percentage of lieutenants believed OBC prepared them in terms of technical/tactical requirements for their initial assignments. The ATLDP indicates that lieutenant skill proficiency is a “readily identifiable issue” with the field of officers surveyed. A significant percentage of lieutenant's supervisors did not respond positively to lieutenant's technical and tactical skill proficiency. ATLDP focus groups recommended lieutenants received more “hands-on, performance oriented training” in leadership while in OBC. The most common training method indicated by those surveyed is large group instruction stressing theoretical concepts vice small group instruction stressing practical leadership skills. Most notably indicated by OBC instructors, lieutenant's technical and tactical skills varied greatly among the commissioning sources. This study uses technical and tactical

skills as criteria for confident and competent small-unit leaders as defined by (know) in the Army Leadership Framework.

Comprehensive Survey—To what extent did OBC prepare lieutenants to:

Task	Question Number	Number Responding	Very Great Or Great Extent %	Moderate Extent %	Slight Extent Not At All %
Accomplish the technical requirements	189	881	33	32	32
Accomplish the tactical requirements	190	863	36	33	31
Conduct combined arms operations	200	773	26	24	48
Apply required doctrine	192	874	33	38	29
Employ digital C2 systems	195	732	16	17	67
Function in current contingency operations	196	772	17	26	57
Conduct information operations	198	781	20	27	53
Conduct deployment operations	199	773	18	21	60

Comprehensive Survey—Assessment of lieutenant skills

Question Number	How well trained in the following skills and qualities were those officers you have supervised? If you are a NCO or WO, please rate the ranks of officers you come into contact with on a regular basis.	Number Answering	Extremely Well Trained %	Very Well Trained %	Moderately Well Trained %	Not Very Well Trained %	Not Trained Well at All %
157	Technical Skills	4014	3.2	26.2	53.4	15.4	1.8
158	Tactical Skills	3965	2.2	21.4	50.0	23.1	3.3
159	Conceptual Skills	4023	2.5	28.6	51.1	16.2	1.7
160	Interpersonal Skills	4031	3.3	30.6	47.8	16.0	2.3

Figure 1. ATLDP, *Strategic Conclusions and Recommendations*, 2000, 2-23

The works most necessary to this research are the Army's doctrinal references. The references reviewed are a compilation of field manuals, Army and proponent regulations, as well as instructional pamphlets. The Army's proponent for doctrine development, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), underwent wholesale updates to the Army's Field Manual library, to which, this research will focus on Field Manuals that define how the Army fights and leads in full spectrum operations. These Field Manuals are FM-1, *The Army*; FM 3-0, *Operations*; and FM 22-100, *Army*

Leadership. This doctrine provides ample background to form expectations of the officer and the environment he will fight.

FM 1, *The Army*, is the Army's capstone doctrinal manual and it defines the Army, what the Army does, and how the Army does it. It points the way to the future and establishes doctrine for employing land power. Although general in scope, it provides the expectations of future combat across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. Important to this research is the delineation of military operations and the spectrum of conflict. It frames the situation that a future small-unit leader may encounter (FM 1 2001, 11, 14, 20-31).

FM 3-0, *Operations*, establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. It provides overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals. As the Army's principal tool for professional education in the art and the science of war, FM 3-0, *Operations*, presents a stable body of operational doctrine rooted in actual military experience. This doctrine provides a foundation for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as providing operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for curricula within the Army Education System. HQ, TRADOC directs all officers in the Army Education System to read and understand FM 3-0, *Operations* (FM 3-0 2001, vii, 1-7, 1-14, 4-2).

The most significant source for this research is FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. This field manual is a single-source reference for all Army leaders. Its purpose to this

study is threefold: establishes a unified leadership theory for all Army leaders, provides a leadership framework (Figure 2) to define criteria for evaluation of Army Values and Leadership, and provides a comprehensive and adaptable leadership resource for the Army of the twenty-first century. For this study, this doctrine provides a definitive outline of expectations of junior officers' values and attributes from which they form the basis of character. Despite providing good definitions of skill competencies (Know) and leadership actions (Do), this source does not provide enough detail in tangible skill competencies and leader actions for this study to use as a template for comparison with Programs of Instruction (POI).



Figure 2. Leadership Framework. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* 1999, 1-3.

This gap will be filled with literature from authors who have led small-unit leaders in full spectrum operations. This will provide the researcher credible sources to identify tasks that are common in full spectrum operations.

Today's OES is a Cold War Model undergoing a modern change to meet the needs of the Army. Despite the heavily decentralized documentation of branch related training, there is adequate material available for data comparison. In order to identify where, when and if these competencies are trained, the research will use the Army's main publications dealing with the OES and leadership development. TRADOC Regulation 351-10, *Institutional Leader Training And Education* will describe the OES, then identify the respective proponents of POIs or specified training, i.e. common core tasks. DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* provides references for individual officer self-development and outlines the specific steps that officers should follow as they progress in the Army.

Three separate Army regulations will be used to study the precommissioning source POIs. AR 145-1, *Senior Reserve Officers Training Corps Program: Organization, Administration, and Training* for the ROTC POI, AR 351-17, *US Military Academy and US Military Academy Preparatory School Admissions Programs* for the USMA POI, and AR 351-5, *United States Army Officer Candidate School* for the OCS POI. These publications allow the research to conduct a task crosswalk through each precommissioning source. Due to the lack of standardization among precommissioning sources, this thesis will use Cadet Command Reg. 145-3, *ROTC Precommissioning Training and Leadership Development* to identify ROTC common-core training and

mandatory training requirements for leader development. In addition, this research will utilize the DA directed common core task list, TRADOC-directed training, and TRADOC-approved tasks identified for inclusion in the precommissioning sources and basic courses. Despite the absence of a sole-source document, these task lists are available at www.atssc.army.mil/itsd/comcor/comcore.htm.

Significant literature exists regarding expectations of officers; ranging from Army values and professionalism to complex themes, such as, civil-military relations. This study will utilize evolving professional military theory regarding expectations of officers from past and present to facilitate analysis of the criteria, in which, lieutenant's values; technical/tactical competencies and leadership actions will define a competent and confident small-unit leader. This review provides sources from books, professional journals, theses, and Monographs.

Selected for this research are six books that provide historical and contemporary perspectives of Army values, professionalism, and leadership. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* contains insight casting Officership as a profession and indicates a distinctive ethos that is needed in the military profession. Huntington declares his thesis in the first sentence of his opening chapter. "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man." (Huntington, 1957, 7). Huntington renders insight to differences of service for monetary gain and that of a higher calling in the service to society. His work defines the concept of a profession by its "expertise, responsibility and corporate-ness." He amplifies this concept by defining the expectations for the military profession, and the need for a distinctive set of Army

Values among officers (Huntington 1957, 11-18). In conjunction with FM 22-100, the researcher expects no gaps in data regarding the Army Values.

Don Snider's and Gale Watkins', *The Future of the Army Profession* is compilation of essays regarding the current state of Officership (Snider and Watkins 2002, xv). It defines officer professionalism in the twenty-first century, where as, Huntington provides a Cold War era definition. Significant to this study is perspectives from legitimate sources on professional leadership. A similar resource is West Point's, *Perspectives on Officership*, which provides principles of officership in four areas: servitude, membership in a time-honored profession, leader of character and warfighter (USMA 2001, iv).

Colonel Dandridge Malone's, *Small-unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach* focuses on the areas of leadership and warfighting as he identifies in very specific terms what small-unit leaders must do to ensure winning a land battle. This literature provides purpose into the study of small-unit leadership and identifies leadership techniques from a credible source (Malone 1983, 1, 24, 32, 62, 119). This source is intended to fill the gaps in the leader actions (Do) by defining standards and providing examples for success.

Leadership is one subject that is not short on resources. An imperative for this study is the perspective of small-unit leadership, specifically, the actions of a lieutenant when leading soldiers. Taylor and Rosenbach's, *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, provides historical vignettes on leadership perspectives and values. Selections from this book aim to recognize successful leadership traits by successful leaders (Taylor and Rosenbach 1996, v). In a recent publication, Kolenda's, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, provides historical and contemporary case studies on leadership, as

well. The most notable case studies outline personal experience as the best teacher of leadership. Developing officers for future combat leadership boils down to practical exercise, and invariably the harder, more high-risk training will prepare the leader better (Kolenda 2001, xvii, xxii, 81-84, 309-315).

Military professional journals have long addressed topics of leadership, officership, and professionalism. Significant authors, such as General Officers and notable experts in the field, provide insight for success in the future. In order to provide vision for tomorrow's leaders, General Shinseki published *The Army's Vision*. Not only does this document provide the expectations for tomorrow's leaders, but describes what tomorrow's force must be able to accomplish. This vision emphasizes responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable as tenets to accomplishing any mission on land (Shinseki *Vision* 1999, 4). As the former President and CEO of the Center for Creative Leadership, Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, articulates the precepts for leader behavior in the future in his work *Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge Too Far* (Ulmer 1998, 2-6,9).

To insure form, this study reviewed previous theses and monographs that paralleled the content of officer development. Major Charles Webster's thesis "Officer Professional Management System XXI Knowledge Accountability" provides a model for research methodology by using a combination of content and quantitative analysis (Webster 1999, 19). Major John G. Bechtol's, "Revision of the United States Army Officer Production System and Curriculum," provides a closely related thesis regarding the inconsistencies within all of the precommissioning sources. Major Bechtol highlights

the waste and inefficiency of officer training with poor qualitative production to the field (Bechtol 2002, 10-17).

In summary, much of the literature provided encompasses the Army's doctrinal transformation and the Army's view of leadership. Significant changes to doctrine control the method that the Army trains. First, it is important to define our expectations of our leaders, then identify the criteria for their success, and finally ensure our leaders are trained to meet those criteria. By using the Army Leadership Framework, this review provided the evaluation criteria of a small-unit leader. In the next chapter, this study will provide the research methodology for the analysis of preparing small-unit leaders for future leadership roles.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research design for this thesis proposes to answer the over-arching question: Does the addition of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) produce better small-unit leaders than the current OES? To analyze the over-arching question, subordinate questions were developed to focus the analysis of available literature, define criteria for evaluation, select the data within each criterion, evaluate the data, and to examine the results. These results were intended to provide recommendations for the problem identified by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP): “Officers are concerned that the officer education system (OES) does not provide them the skills for success in full spectrum operations” (ATLDP 2000, OS-5).

The methodology used was a course of action comparison with and without BOLC in the OES. The four steps leading to this comparison were: define the evaluation criteria, define the task training that supports the evaluation criteria, identify the current OES task training within the criteria, and evaluate the effectiveness of all task training. During these four steps, one or more of the answers to the subordinate questions presented themselves. The findings from each step assisted in the development of conclusions regarding the criteria in each course of action. The analysis is based entirely by the content of literature examined. If the literature fails to provide clear task training to criteria content, then a comparison of historical, doctrinal and military professional theoretical literature is done to eliminate vagueness. This provides commonalty in the task training.

There are two research techniques utilized in this study - Content Analysis and Quantitative Analysis. Initially, content analysis is utilized to enable this research to sort through a large amount of data quickly and systematically while maintaining focus on the frame of reference (Carney 1972). The Content Analysis technique for this study is modeled after Major Charles Webster's Thesis - *Officer Professional Management System XXI Knowledge Accountability* (Webster 2001, 20). Despite differences in subject matter, Major Webster's research technique is compatible with this research. This technique facilitated a variety of purposes of this research (Gallagher et al. 2000):

- Analyzed historical, social, organizational trends
- Evaluated programs, instruments, and practices
- Uncovered information about the Army's values and attitudes
- Confirmed findings from previous studies or other research
- Obtained descriptive information about a task that has theoretical significance.

Upon completion of the Content Analysis, this study conducts a quantitative analysis involving the collection of training hours in the Programs of Instruction (POIs) and analyzed those training hours as data in numerical form. The data of training hours was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics to permit the research to describe the magnitude and/or direction of observed values, trends and relationships, and the probability that they would have occurred by chance (Mertens 1998, 1-31).

The first step in this research is to define the evaluation criteria. The target of the evaluation criteria is the small-unit leader. A small-unit leader is referred to as a direct level leader. One who is face to face with his subordinates and is the first line leader. Direct leadership takes place in those organizations where subordinates are accustomed

to seeing their leaders all the time: teams, squads, section and platoon or equivalent. The leader's span of influence is that which he can reach out and touch. It may range from a handful of people to hundreds (FM 22-100 1999, 1-39).

This step in the research provides the foundation for the second step. Document collection and review in form of secondary research was the primary method used during this step (Webster 1999, 21). FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* is the lead doctrinal resource for leadership. It is very precise in values and attributes and provides good focus for expectations in leadership (see Figure 4-1), however it lacks content when defining technical and tactical skill expectations. Countless works support FM 22-100's defined Army Values system. Additional works identifying specific sets of values and attributes are indicated in the literature review (chapter 2).

To insure relevancy of the current values system, additional sources were reviewed to outline the Army's emerging leadership doctrine. General Shinseki's, *The Army Vision*, provided the challenges and expectations of the Army's future leaders as well as Walter Ulmer's, *Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another Bridge Too Far*, articulates precepts for leader behavior in the future. This area of review was intended to cover gaps for expectations of officers in the future.

From the analysis of the evaluated criteria, a gap exists for the expectations of tactical and technical skills a small-unit leader must know and do. To fill this gap, this study used use a combination of doctrinal references (historical and emerging) and a historical case study of combat unit leader skills. Upon comparison, they provided a tactical and technical task list that confirmed a common skill set for direct leader actions (see Appendix E).

STP 21-II-MQS, *Military Qualification Standards II Manual of Common Tasks*, this 1991 manual is the last published reference providing a common standard in task training for Lieutenants (see Appendix A).

TRADOC, *Military Common Core*, provides an electronic information on the common core initiative. These common core are a combination of common military, common leader and directed tasks required for specific courses, grade levels or organizational levels. Most important are the tasks directed for the precommissioning and OBC common core (TRADOC *Common Core* 2002)(Appendix B and C).

U.S. Army Research Institute For Behavioral and Social science, Technical Report 440, *Identification of Combat Unit Leader Skill and Leader-Group Interaction Process*. This study identified leader skills and leader-group interaction processes that may have potential influence on unit tactical performance. This analysis was comprised of recorded engagement simulation data from previous field exercises. A taxonomy of leader skills and group interactive process was synthesized, and an operational listing of individual leader skills was developed (TC 440 1980, vi) (Appendix D).

The emerging doctrinal reference utilized to identify tactical and technical skills was FM 3-0, *Operations*. It provided the foundations of Full Spectrum Operations. It defined the battlefield and the elements of Combat Power. Using a Content Analysis technique, tasks were identified from Maneuver, Firepower, Leadership, Protection, and Information (FM 3-0 2001, 4-2) and compared to historical references in Annexes A through D.

Once the evaluation criteria were defined, the second step was to define the task training that supports the evaluation criteria. Since technical and tactical skills require

specificity in definition, commonalities exist between the defined skill and the task training. It is a simple crosswalk to identify the skill to task. More complex in nature was identifying the task training that supports Army values and Leadership. Utilizing the same references to cover the skills gap, this research used a Content Analysis to identify the task training that instills Army values and provides leadership development.

The third step in this research identified the current OES task training within the criteria. A review of the precommissioning Programs of Instruction (POIs) and OBC POIs answered the subordinate question of how the OES trains its officers, specifically how the OES instills values, develops skills and conducts leader training. A quantitative analysis was conducted by calculating the training hours in each POI. By doing so, answered all tertiary questions regarding training hours currently programmed for developing small-unit leaders.

The fourth step in this research evaluated the effectiveness of all task training. This step answered: how is proficiency measured? The research consisted of a quantitative analysis that separated training hours into three categories: instruction, performance-oriented and exercise training. Each category is weighted for its training value as outlined by Army Doctrine. Using the doctrinal reference for Battle Focused Training as outlined in FM 7-0 (formerly FM 25-100), this research analyzed the training hours within each POI for its ability to “Train for Combat Proficiency” (FM 7-0 2002, 2-16). These are standards based goals under realistic conditions that “seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of the classroom into the field; fire weapons; maneuver as a combined arms team; and incorporate protective measures against enemy actions” (FM 7-0, 2-16). Inherent for training combat proficiency is the execution of Performance-

Oriented and Multiechelon Training. Performance-Oriented training is defined as “learning best by doing, using an experiential, hands-on approach” (FM 7-0 2002, 2-16) and Multiechelon training is the “most effective and efficient way of sustaining combat proficiency utilizing large-scale training events provide an excellent opportunity for valuable individual, leader, crew, and small-unit training” (FM 7-0 2002, 2-20). The lowest unit value was assigned to instruction and the highest value was assigned to Multiechelon exercise training, thus one instruction hour equals one unit, one performance-oriented hour equals two units and one Multiechelon exercise hour equals two and one-half units.

The parameters and categories used in this final step are all three precommissioning sources POIs (USMA, ROTC, and OCS) and the selected OBC POIs (Field Artillery, Military Intelligence, and Transportation Corps). What is not evaluated is the Direct Commission because it does not have a precommissioning POI and the remaining OBCs not listed. These POIs are omitted due to time constraints.

The final step guided this research to conclusions from gaps and redundancies when cross walking tasks among the POIs, and identifying training hours that do not support Army Doctrine by programming a heavier concentration of classroom hours vice practical exercise and field training hours.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Evaluation Criteria -- Be, Know, Do

Samuel Huntington, in *The Soldier and the State*, distinguishes the military profession from all other professions by identifying a specialized expertise that is common to all officers. This specialized expertise is the “management of violence” (Huntington 1957, 11). Huntington indicates that the uniqueness of this skill requires the officer corps to have a distinctive set of responsibilities and live within a corporate character (Huntington 1957, 14). The character that conducts the management of violence is the foundation of the today’s modern Army and for the Army of the future “it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different” (Shinseki *Vision* 1999, 7).

A group of officers in the teeming camp determined to compel Congress to settle its debts with the threat of military action. They attempted to enlist their victorious commander, General George Washington, to lead their plot. On March 15, 1783, Washington entered the officers’ assembly and warned them of the grave danger inherent in their scheme. But his off-hand comment, intended to put them at ease, demonstrated once again the depth of the character that had sustained the revolution. “Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray, but almost blind in the service of my country.” The act, the statement, and the power of a leader’s example quelled an incipient rebellion. As Jefferson later commented, “The moderation and virtue of a single character probably prevented the revolution from being closed, as most others have been, by a subversion of that Liberty it was intended to establish.” (FM 1 2001, i)

FM 1, *The Army*

This vignette of General Washington at Newburgh, as illustrated in the first pages of the Army's capstone doctrinal manual, demonstrates the Army's resolution for leaders with distinctive character. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, contributes the most depth in defining this character. It delineates the responsibilities of officers, as leaders, to win our

nation's wars by leadership in combat. This leader must have character that is uniquely qualified to lead soldiers into harm's way. For this obligation, the Army commands its leaders to prescribe to a leadership framework that is defined as “Be, Know, Do” (FM 22-100 1999, 1-2).

Residing within this character is a special set of values and attributes that shape a leader. In the Army’s culture, there is a distinctive set of Army values and attributes are manifested within a leader. Army values emphasize the relationship between that distinctive character and the competence a professional officer must possess. The Army identifies this character in the leadership framework as the “Be.” The “Be” is comprised of seven distinctive values and thirteen leader attributes (FM 22-100 1999, 2-3 through 2-18) (see Table 1).

Army Values
<i>Loyalty</i> - Bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.
<i>Duty</i> - Fulfill your obligations.
<i>Respect</i> - Treat people as they should be treated.
<i>Selfless Service</i> - Put the welfare of the nation, the Army and subordinates before you.
<i>Honor</i> - Live up to all the Army Values (moral compass).
<i>Integrity</i> - Do what is right legally and morally.
<i>Personal Courage</i> - Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).
Leader Attributes
<i>Will</i> is the inner drive that compels soldiers and leaders to keep going.
<i>Initiative</i> is the ability to act when there are no clear instructions.
<i>Self-discipline</i> is the habit of doing the right thing.
<i>Judgement</i> means making the best decision for the situation.
<i>Cultural Awareness</i> is being sensitive to the different backgrounds of your people.
<i>Intelligence</i> is thinking, learning, and reflecting; then they applying.
<i>Self-confidence</i> is the faith that you’ll act correctly and properly in any situation.
<i>Health Fitness</i> is everything you do to maintain good health.
<i>Physical Fitness</i> is the ability to overcome the effects of combat.
<i>Military Bearing</i> is emulation of a good soldier through courtesy and appearance.
<i>Self-control</i> is displaying the proper amount of emotion and passion.
<i>Balance</i> is displaying the right emotion for the situation and can read others state.

<i>Stability</i> is being steady under pressure and fatigue and calm in the face of danger.

Table 1. Army Values and Leadership Attributes.

The Army instills these values and attributes through education, reinforcement, and internalization. Once these values and attributes are learned, leaders must live by them and insure their adherence; thus, leaders become persons of character (FM 22-100 1999, 2-19; FM 1 2001, 11; Huntington 1957, 10; Shinseki Vision 1999, 7). FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, identifies this process as the pyramid of character development. Since the Army is a profession of arms, that requires many functions in the management of violence, there is an obligation of competence within the character. Professions such as medicine and law require a level of competence to practice and require knowledge of distinctive skills to be considered a professional (Huntington 1957, 7). Army officers must possess certain levels of knowledge to embody competence. This competence is identified in the leadership framework as the “Know” (FM 22-100 1999, 1-5). These levels of knowledge progressively increase as the officer assumes positions of greater responsibility. The “Know” is comprised of technical and tactical skills. FM 22-100 defines technical skills as knowing how to use your equipment, which includes basic soldier skills, and tactical skills as knowing how to employ units in combat. The vernacular of “Know” decrees mastery. Mastery is the hallmark of a professional. This sets officers apart as competent professionals and “results from hard, realistic training” (FM 22-100 1999, 2-105).

Character and Knowledge, in and of themselves, are not enough to affirm the leader. It is critical that an officer applies his professional expertise in a manner that is

consistent with his character. This application of knowledge is identified in the leadership framework as the “Do” (FM 22-100 1999, 1-6). Colonel Dandridge Malone, USA (Ret), *Small-unit Leadership*, states that in order to win on the battlefield small-unit leaders must direct and control the battle itself. Malone is consistent with Army doctrine as he identifies the role of small-unit leaders as a doer vice a manager. “In battle, when soldiers die, and in battle, some must, they cannot be managed to their deaths. They must be led there” (Malone 1983, 30). Doing denotes leading by example and directing from face to face. Colonel John Ripley, USMC (Ret), *Thoughts on Small-unit Leadership*, states the most critical element a leader must have is “decisiveness in combat” (West Point 2001, 318). The “Do,” is defined by Army leadership doctrine as “leader-actions” which “include influencing, operating and improving” (FM 22-100 1999, 1-28). To influence, leaders must be able to effectively communicate, make decisions and motivate. To operate, leaders must be able to effectively plan and prepare, execute and assess. To improve, leaders must be able to develop individuals, build teams and learn.

It is evident that the Army requires its leaders to possess the characteristics of Be, Know, Do. Comprehensively, the Army asserts the importance in its capstone doctrinal manual, FM 1, *The Army*, outlines the principles in FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, and provides it as our vision for the future in *The Army Vision*. Accordingly, the criterion by which the effectiveness of a small-unit leader should be evaluated is Be, Know, Do.

How the Army Trains -- Be, Know, Do

Leader development is a lifelong learning process, and the responsibility resides within three core domains, they are, institutional, operational, and self-development. The institutional domain is responsible for the “education and training of key knowledge,

skills and attributes to operate in any environment” (FM 7-0 2002,1-20). It is within the institutional domain that the Officer Education System (OES) trains new officers the standards. “The goal of all training is to achieve the standard” (FM 7-0, 2002, 2-16). Army training doctrine directs the conduct of training to use the crawl-walk-run approach (FM 7-0, 2002, 5-8). This facilitates a standards based approach to training. The crawl stage of training is at the basic level and is relatively simple to conduct because it requires little support. Within the OES, the crawl stage is referred to as instruction. There are multiple methods of instruction, which normally consist of an instructor telling or showing information in the form of lessons to students. Methods of instruction are defined in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products* (TRADOC 350-70 1999, H-2) (see Table 2).

METHOD	DESCRIPTION	APPLICATION
Lecture	An instructor verbally passes information to attending students. Student participation is minimal. It has low training efficiency.	Lecture is a means to tell students information they need to know. Some of its more important uses: - Disseminate information not in print. - Orient.
Demonstration	The instructor shows and explains the operation or action to the students. The student is expected to be able to perform the operation or action after the demonstration.	This method of instruction shows how something is done. Examples: - Manipulative operations - Equipment operations - Teamwork - Illustrate principles
Guest Speaker	An individual, other than a member of the normal Staff and Faculty, presents information to support a specific lesson to the class.	Experts provide information directly supportive of the learning objectives. The most important uses of the guest speaker are to provide information or motivation based on extensive experience.
Large Group Instruction	A means of delivering training that places much of the responsibility on the instructor or facilitator for the presentation and management control of the training.	The large group process provides a means to manage the training method easily. Students are moved through the training as a group with minimal attention to individual training/assistance requirements.

Small Group Instruction (SGI)	A means of delivering training which places the responsibility for learning on the soldier through participation in small groups led by small group leaders (SGL) who serve as role models throughout the course.	The small group process is a technique for learning in small groups that capitalizes on (uses) student experiences, requires intensive student interaction, and makes each student responsible for his/her own learning.
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Table 2. Methods of instruction

At the walk stage, training will become incrementally more difficult, requiring more resources to increase the level of realism. Within the OES, the walk stage is referred to as performance oriented instruction. There are multiple methods of performance oriented instruction. Regardless, students are required to perform the action. TRADOC training regulations define the methods of performance oriented instruction (TRADOC 350-70 1999, H-1) (see Table 3).

METHOD	DESCRIPTION	APPLICATION
Practical Exercise	Student is required to perform the action required by the learning objective under controlled conditions to the established standard.	The most efficient way to learn to do something is to actually do it. This method of instruction is the best way for a student to learn to perform the required action to the established standard.
Case Study	The student is presented a description of a situation and is required to solve problems or identify actions related to the situation.	Provides an excellent means for a student to solve problems either individually or as a member of a group.
Role Playing	Similar to the case study. Students act out the simulated situation. Student may assume the duties of a staff member in an organization and perform the work of that position.	A means to assess decision making in a specific role. Provides opportunities for the student to develop solutions to unpredictable situations and conditions.
Peer Instruction	Individuals learn from their peers in a group (team, squad, etc.) when working toward achieving common learning objectives.	It is useful for team building if properly controlled by the staff. This technique leverages the advantages of individual training, peer pressure, and motivation to achieve a team objective.
Test	Students are evaluated on the performance of the action required by the learning objective.	Used to determine if the students can perform the objectives to the established standards.

Table 3. Methods of performance oriented instruction

At the run stage, the level of difficulty for the training event intensifies. The run stage approaches the level of realism expected in combat. Within the OES, the run stage is referred to as exercise training. Exercise training differs from performance oriented instruction because it assembles a group of tasks for students to train collaboratively. Conditions for exercise training will vary from classroom to field. TRADOC training regulations define the types of exercises (TRADOC 350-70 1999, V-5) (see Table 4).

Type	Description	Application
STX	A short, scenario-driven, mission-oriented, limited exercise designed to train one collective task or a group of related tasks or drills through practice.	Supports training at company, platoon, and staff section levels.
FTX	A high-cost, high-overhead exercise conducted under simulated combat conditions in the field.	Supports training at battalion, company, platoon, and staff section levels.
Drill	A disciplined, repetitious exercise to teach and perfect a skill or procedure (action); i.e., a collective task or task step.	Supports training of platoon-size and smaller elements.
Simulation	Any representation or imitation of reality simulating part of a system, the operation of a system, and the environment in which a system will operate are three common types. There are virtual and constructive simulations.	Replaces/Complements live training. Provides the means to safely practice an action or activity under any condition. Can be used for individual training

Table 4. Types of exercises

In order for exercise training to be effective, the training must be realistic. Realistic training is modeled after the way the Army fights within all “dimensions of the battlefield” and in “combined arms teams” by replicating the “stresses, sounds and conditions of combat” (FM 7-0 2002, 5-12). To do this, leaders “must seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of the classroom into the field; fire weapons; maneuver as a combined arms team; and incorporate protective measures against enemy actions”

(FM 7-0 2002, 2-16). The effect of realistic training excites and motivates soldiers as well as leaders, thus building confidence and competence (FM 7-0 2002, 2-16; Kolenda 2001, 84, 314; Malone 1983, 68).

It is necessary to understand how the Army trains to grasp how the precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBC) programs of instruction (POIs) are training lieutenants to become small-unit leaders. FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, and TRADOC Regulation 350-70 provide great depth in asserting the preferred methods of training are experiential, specifically, in the form of performance oriented and exercises.

How to train -- Be (Values and Attributes)

The task training that supports the education of Army Values and Leader Attributes that is conducted within the OES precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBC) is listed in Table 5.

Title	Method
Army values training or leadership doctrine.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Apply leadership fundamentals to create a climate that fosters ethical behavior.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Develop a cohesive organization.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Develop subordinate leaders.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Take charge of a unit.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Counsel subordinates.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Implement small-unit fitness program.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Supervise the implementation of Army Family Team Building program.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Motivate subordinates to improve performance.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction

Train subordinates to perform an individual task.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction
Leadership guest speakers.	Lecture/ Large Group Instruction

Table 5. Army Values and Leader Attribute Task Training

The task training that supports the reinforcement of Army Values and Leader Attributes that is conducted within the OES precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBC) is listed in Table 6. This task training is performance-oriented and provides critical feedback when in personal interaction with superiors, peers, and subordinates.

Title	Method
Battle Analysis	Case Study
Leadership Case Studies	Case Study
Student Led Classes	Peer Instruction
Chain of Command (Student Led)	Role Playing/ Practical Exercise /FTX/STX/Drill/ Simulation

Table 6. Performance oriented Army Values and Leader Attributes Task Training

While instructions and performance-oriented training are applicable for the basic education and reinforcement of the seven Army Values and thirteen Leader Attributes, they are not enough to instill and manifest the “Be” in a leader’s character. Values and attributes training must be internalized into a leader’s character. FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*, reinforces the interim conclusion regarding the training of values and attributes. “Army leaders must teach their subordinates moral principles, ethical theory, Army Values and leadership attributes...Subordinates gain deeper understanding from experiencing, observing, and reflecting on the aspects of Army leadership under the

guidance of their leaders” (FM 22-100 1999, E-5). This internalization process is done through interaction with senior leaders who must provide feedback and assessment. This interaction consists of one on one coaching, informal discussions and formal developmental counseling. This complimentary procedure follows a logical process of defining, teaching, experiential, observing and reflecting under the guidance of their leaders (FM 22-100 1999, E-7).

How to train -- Know (Technical and Tactical Skills)

The task training that supports the education of basic soldier technical skills that is conducted within the OES precommissioning sources and OBCs is listed in Table 7. Both instruction and performance-oriented methods are used in technical skill task training.

Title	Method
Navigate from one point on the ground to another point while dismounted/mounted	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test
Communicate by a tactical radio	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test
Analyze terrain	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test
Employ hand grenades	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Operate an M16/M4 Rifle	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Operate an M60/M240 MG	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Decontaminate yourself and equipment using chemical decontamination kits	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Detect chemical agents using M8 or M9 detector paper	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Protect yourself from contamination using your protective mask	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Protect yourself from contamination	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Process captives	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Process captured materiel	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Report intelligence information	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Recon a route	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test
Map Recon	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test

Conduct pre-combat checks	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Employ Field Discipline	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Perform first aid	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Conduct preventive maintenance checks and services	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Evaluate a casualty	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Test
Maintain an M16/M4 rifle	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Maintain an M60/M240 machine gun	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Maintain your assigned protective mask	Demonstration, Practical Exercise
Request medical evacuation	Demonstration, Practical Exercise

Table 7. Technical Skills

The task training that supports the education of tactical skills that are conducted within the OES precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBC) is listed in Table 8. Instruction and performance-oriented methods are utilized in this tactical skill task training.

Title	Method
Conduct small-unit movement techniques	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Conduct small-unit combat operations according to the law of war	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Lead a convoy serial/march unit	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
React to Contact (Dismounted)	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
React to Contact (Mounted)	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Defend a position	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Prepare a range card for an M60 machine gun	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Adjust indirect fire	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Employ physical security measures	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Enforce detection prevention measures	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Implement basic measures to reduce your vulnerabilities to terrorist acts/attack	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX

Implement operational security measures	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
Implement preventive medicine measures	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
React to a chemical or biological hazard/attack	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
React to direct and indirect fire	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX
React to nuclear hazard or attack	Demonstration, Practical Exercise, Drill, STX, FTX

Table 8. Tactical Skills

The interim conclusion regarding the skills needed to be trained for developing competent small-unit leaders are consistent with FM 22-100's principles. "The Army's ultimate responsibility is to win our nation's wars. For you as an Army leader, leadership in combat is your primary mission and most important challenge" (FM 22-100 1999, 1-1). Regardless of one's skill function in the Army, the mission of a warfighter requires a distinctive set of skills that is outlined in FM 3-0, *Operations*, Maneuver, Firepower, Leadership, Protection, and Information (FM 3-0 2001, 4-2). Army leadership and training doctrine specify that these skills are comprised of knowing how to use your equipment, basic soldier skills, and knowing how to employ units in combat. Most importantly, mastery of these skills is done through performance oriented and training (FM 22-100 1999, 2-105; FM 7-0 2002, 2-16).

How to train -- Do (Leader-actions)

Technical and tactical task training are critical components in the development of Leader-actions, however most important is the multiechelon and realistic exercise training that provides officers experiential leadership training. The task training that supports the development of leader-actions that are conducted within the OES

precommissioning sources and Officer Basic Courses (OBC) is listed in Table 9. All methods of instruction are utilized in this process.

Title	Method
Develop a Plan	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Issue an oral operations order	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Conduct a military briefing	Practical Exercise
Plan unit movement	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Train a Unit	Practical Exercise, Peer Instruction
Integrate threat capabilities into mission planning	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Employ the risk management process during mission planning	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Supervise CSS functions during operations	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Supervise preventive maintenance checks and services	Practical Exercise, Peer Instruction
Supervise the implementation of air defense measures	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Supervise the implementation of preventive medicine policies	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Conduct pre-combat checks	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Employ Field Discipline	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Supervise unit maintenance operations	Practical Exercise, STX, FTX, Simulation
Counsel Subordinates	Practical Exercise

Table 9. Leader-actions

The interim conclusion regarding the leader actions that are needed to be trained for developing small-unit leaders are consistent with FM 22-100's principles. "Leadership in combat; the greatest challenge, requires a basis for your motivation and will" (FM 22-100 1999, 2-121). Regardless of one's skill function in the Army, the small-unit leader must embody the character, know the required skills, and apply both in leadership. FM

22-100 specifies more directly that these skills are comprised of planning and preparing, execution of known skills, assessing and improve and develop their subordinates. FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, and FM 22-100, Army Leadership, reinforce the importance of “hard, realistic training” executed through performance oriented and exercise training.

How the Precommissioning Sources train -- Be, Know, Do

Each of the precommissioning sources organizes their Programs of Instruction (POI) in different methods. Despite being a four-year military institution, the United States Military Academy (USMA) conducts military training over only two terms. These terms are two weeks each January and twelve weeks each summer. The January term consists of lecture instruction while the summer term consists of performance oriented and exercise training (USMA 2002; AR 351-17 2000). The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) distributes classroom instruction evenly over four semesters. ROTC programs two semesters in each year, and only the third and fourth years are accountable to POI. ROTC schedules instruction training plus one FTX for each semester as well as one six-week summer term for military training (HQ Cadet Command 2003; AR 145-1 1999). The Officer Candidate School (OCS) is a fourteen-week program that programs task training for potential officers that have received previous military training (AR 351-5 1987, 1). Research of the precommissioning POI provided varied results in task training hours of values, technical, tactical and leader-actions. For values training (see Table 10), instruction hours provided the largest disparity. Among all precommissioning sources, USMA programmed hundreds of more hours for leadership instruction. Due to the classroom hours, USMA has a discernable amount of total value task training hours.

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
USMA	360	40	40	440
OCS	19	33	63	115
ROTC	68	19	50	137

Table 10. Precommissioning source Values Task Training.

For technical skill training (see Table 11), the instruction and exercise training hours provided the largest disparity. Weapons and land navigation make up the largest part of technical task training. While USMA programs an even distribution of technical training, OCS does not program weapons qualification or weapons live fire ranges in their POIs. This is a result of the previous military experience of their candidates, however OCS does conduct a higher number of exercise hours in multiple FTXs that combine land navigation and tactical radio and medical evacuation. Of note, ROTC conducts all of its technical task training during their FTXs or the summer exercise term (USMA 2002, 1-78; USAIS 2002, 6; HQ Cadet Command 2003, 1-2).

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
USMA	71	210	904	1185
OCS	3	179	1586	1786
ROTC	0	8	132	140

Table 11. Precommissioning source Technical Task Training.

For tactical training (see Table 12), the overall training hours are similar, however they are divergent in methods of instruction and exercise. Tactical training primarily consists of small-unit maneuver and unit protection tasks. USMA programs all methods of instruction on every tactical task listed in Table 8, but programs fewer exercises hours, comparatively. OCS focuses solely on small-unit maneuver training, however it conducts

a higher number of exercise hours in drills and multiple FTXs. ROTC does provide a high number of exercise hours during their summer exercise term, however their program indicates low hours for instruction and performance oriented training (USMA 2002, 1-78; USAIS 2002, 6; HQ Cadet Command 2003, 1-2).

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
USMA	44	124	187	355
OCS	4	96	480	580
ROTC	5	23	465	493

Table 12. Precommissioning source Tactical Task Training.

There are distinctive differences in training hours for leader-actions training (see Table 13). This training has a heavy concentration of planning and supervision tasks. Again, OCS programs a heavy concentration of student led planning and supervision tasks, on the other hand, ROTC programs minimal planning and supervision training in their POI. USMA's POI focuses heavily on instruction of leader tasks, however USMA imbeds leader-actions for second-year through fourth-year cadets. Because the USMA POI does not account for these hours, they will be included in the evaluation of the effectiveness of training.

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
USMA	241	25	160	426
OCS	21	188.5	336	545.5
ROTC	36	5	34	75

Table 13. Precommissioning source Leader-actions Task Training

In summary, two interim conclusions are derived from how the precommissioning sources train Be, Know, Do. First, despite being a consistent instruction throughout the curricula, values and attributes are trained unequally across the sources. Second, precommissioning sources do not have a standard skill set for training. Gaps and varying POI schedules do not sustain combat proficiency in accordance with FM 7-0, *Training the Force*.

How the Officer Basic Courses train -- Be, Know, Do

The Officer Basic Courses (OBCs) organize their POIs in the same manner. This is a result of TRADOC oversight. Each OBC consists of three main categories: leadership, basic officer skill and branch specific skills. While every OBC provides core instruction on leadership, each program provides varying degrees of basic officer skill and branch specific skill training hours. Despite similar POI structures and lengths, the research identified a disparity among the technical and tactical skill training, due to the differences in basic officer skills training.

There were no distinct differences for values training (see Table 14), however the overall task training hours are lower than the precommissioning POIs.

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
Field Artillery	14	4	0	18
Military Intelligence	13	2	2.5	17.5
Transportation	17	4	5	26

Table 14. Officer Basic Course Values Task Training.

Technical skill training hours (see Table 15) provided the largest disparity among the OBCs. Military Intelligence OBC consisted of a high number of performance oriented

and exercise training hours with a heavy concentration of terrain analysis, navigation and communications (USAIC 1998, 3). For technical skills, the Transportation POI programs a M16 Rifle qualification range and a heavy concentration of maintenance and individual protection task training (USATC 1999, 3, 38, 52-55). The Field Artillery POI does not program any small arms weapons training (DIR Warfighting 2001, 4). Rather than focusing on rifle qualification, Military Intelligence OBC conducts a M16 Rifle range with the primary task of supervision and marksmanship is secondary. Other than artillery gunnery, none of the OBCs programmed alternate small arms or crew served weapons training. The OBC's program a comparatively lower number of overall technical training hours to USMA and OCS, however, the performance-oriented hours among all POIs are relatively similar (USAIC 1998, 3; USATC 1999, 3; DIR Warfighting 2001, 4).

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
Field Artillery	6	210	288	504
Military Intelligence	25	491	404	920
Transportation	17	277	5	299

Table 15. Officer Basic Course Technical Task Training.

Tactical skill training hours (see Table 16) produced the lowest aggregate training hours among all OBCs. The Field Artillery POI distributed training among all three methods of instruction, however it concentrated that instruction heavily on the tasks “defend a position” and “adjustment of fire” in Drills, STX, FTX and Simulation exercise training (DIR Warfighting 2001, 4, 8-9, 17, 25, 26-29, 32). The only source of significant tactical task training in the Military Intelligence POI was a small-unit patrolling field-training exercise (USAIC 1998, 18-19). Military Intelligence OBC did not program any

other protection training tasks. Transportation POI focused on vehicular convoy and mounted protection performance oriented training as well as programming a two-week field training exercise that concentrated heavily on unit protection and field skills (USATC 1999, 3, 52-55). Comparatively, the OBCs programmed a lower number of tactical skill training than the precommissioning sources.

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
Field Artillery	19	96	56	171
Military Intelligence	6	7	30	43
Transportation	21	22	246	289

Table 16. Officer Basic Course Tactical Task Training.

In comparison of programmed leader-actions training among OBCs (see Table 17), all POIs were relatively similar. Each OBC organized performance-oriented training for the development of planning (operating), however the Transportation POI provided a increasing higher number of supervisory (influencing) task training in maintenance, service support and unit movements.

	Instruction	Performance oriented	Exercises	Total
Field Artillery	61	141	20	222
Military Intelligence	29	137	12	178
Transportation	64	93	260	417

Table 17. Officer Basic Course Leader-actions Task Training.

In summary, three interim conclusions are derived from how the OBCs train Be, Know, Do. First, the 1987 *Leadership Development Study* chaired by Major General Sullivan standardized common leadership instruction among the OBCs. However, those

curriculum hours are relatively low and unable to fill the gaps of the precommissioning sources (Leadership Development Study 1987, Executive Summary). In addition to the leadership instruction, the study outlined two additional aims of implementation: a training structure that develops technical and tactical competency and a system that sustains leader development for the future (Leadership Development Study 1987, Executive Summary). Second, DA-PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Career Development and Career Management*, as well as AR 351-1, *Individual Military Education and Training*, directs proponent branch schools to develop POIs focusing on “branch specific qualification” (DA-PAM 600-3 1998, 2-4). The aims of the *Leadership Development Study* do not coincide with the written directives of Army Regulations. Subsequently, technical and tactical task training and leader-actions training focus, solely, on branch specific tasks. Third, training gaps between the precommissioning sources and low levels of proficiency due to POI scheduling can not be recovered by the OBC POIs because OBCs focus on branch specific training.

How the OES trains-- Be, Know, Do

The analysis of the current state of task training in the OES indicates disparities among each precommissioning source and OBC. Among the precommissioning sources, POI lengths and schedule of training vary greatly and are without standardization. Analysis of all task training provided significant results regarding the programming of training. Values task training analysis showed that USMA programs a higher number of instruction hours. Technical task training analysis showed ROTC does not program instruction hours and programs a significantly lower number of performance-oriented and exercise training hours. Tactical task training analysis showed a disparity of methods of

instruction. While USMA programs higher instruction hours, it programs less than half of the exercise hours compared to other precommissioning sources. As far as, leader-actions training, ROTC programmed substantially fewer task-training hours than the other precommissioning sources.

Among the OBCs, POI lengths and schedules of training do not vary. Each POI is seventeen to nineteen weeks in length and partitions training into the three categories of leadership, basic officer skills, and branch specific skills. While all OBCs reflect similar programming of Values task training, it compares significantly lower to precommissioning sources in overall training hours. For technical training, Military Intelligence OBC programs more hours across all methods of instruction. Of note, all OBCs focuses technical training on only one or two tasks that support their overall linkage to branch specific training. An example, Transportation OBC programs nearly all of it performance-oriented training in conducting preventative maintenance checks and services (USATC 1999, 3, 52-55). The same occurs for tactical task training as OBCs program tactical training to suit branch specific training. An example, Field Artillery OBC programs all of its performance-oriented and exercise training in conducting firing positions and adjusting fire (DIR Warfighting 2001, 4, 8-9, 17, 26-29, 32). As for leader-actions task training, OBCs program relatively similar overall hours in training. The Transportation POI imbeds a greater opportunity for officers to take charge (influence) of small-units, whereas Field Artillery and Military Intelligence focus on planning (operating).

At the current state of OES task training, a ROTC commissioned Military Intelligence Officer has fewer hours of performance-oriented values training that was

particularly low in programmed counseling and team building hours. An OCS commissioned Field Artillery Officer had virtually no technical task instruction and did not conduct small arms or crew-served weapons training in any capacity. A USMA or ROTC commissioned Military Intelligence officer will experience half of the tactical task training than that of an OCS commissioned Transportation Officer. These inconsistencies are evidence that officers report to their first unit of assignment with divergent levels of preparation.

Evaluate the Effectiveness of OES Task Training

Certain institutions facilitate the conforming to Army values by controlling ones living environment by enforcing rules, policies, and regulations, as well as reinforcing history and tradition and prominent individuals. USMA's environment affirms the internalization of Army values through feedback from peer interaction and instructor mentorship. After the cadet's first-year, each cadet progressively serves in a leadership position facilitating the training of leader-actions through application. USMA cadets have a greater ability to internalize the imbedded values of their institution (USMA 2002, 1-78; USAIS POI 2002, 6; HQ Cadet Command 2003, 1-2).

Conversely proportionate, ROTC cadets do not live in a controlled environment marked by discipline. On a weekly basis, ROTC cadets have minimal interaction with peers and superiors (HQ Cadet Command 2003 2002, 1-2; Bechtol 2002). Although OCS candidates have previous indoctrination into the Army values system, the fourteen-week program is structured with discipline and control. This environment makes it easier for instructors to raise stress and provide external feedback, however it does not allow for character self-development through experiential learning (USAIS 2002, 6). In review of

the overall training hours from precommissioning to OBC, clearly the precommissioning sources are weighted as the main effort for instilling the Army values, however only USMA provides enough education, reinforcement and feedback systems to facilitate internalization.

Due to scheduling and partitioning of the technical task training among precommissioning source POIs, the effectiveness of the overall training does not adhere to sustaining combat proficiency. USMA cadets conduct technical task training between their first and second year, which could leave a three-year gap before they conduct any further technical task training. If OBCs do not program technical task training, i.e. rifle marksmanship in Field Artillery POI, officer may span a four-year gap and report to their first unit of assignment without having sustained proficiencies in rifle, or any, marksmanship. Due to ineffective scheduling of POIs, compartmentalized partitioning of training, and selective task programming, the OES fails to sustain combat proficiency in the small-unit leader. This study identified the OES' inability to sustain combat proficiency because the precommissioning sources and OBCs do no extensive problems scheduling, partitioning and selective task programming among all precommissioning sources and OBCs

While the scheduling of tactical task training does not yield to the same degradation as technical skills, the density of hours in performance-oriented and exercise training after precommissioning noticeably recedes. Mastery of tactical proficiency or knowing how to employ units in combat is critical to the development of leader-actions (FM 22-100 1999, 2-105, 2-108, 2-112). Without programmed multiechelon training,

there is minimal experiential learning. In review of all OBCs, tactical training was ineffective because it failed to provide experiential training in protection related tasks.

Technical and tactical task training are critical components in the development of Leader-actions, however the ineffectiveness of the OES to provide multiechelon and realistic exercise training inhibits the ability to foster experiential learning. Of note, feedback is critical to this development. An effective model would nest both technical and tactical tasks in a multiechelon FTX that provides small-unit leaders the opportunity to lead small-units under duress and integrates a feedback process. While the precommissioning sources programmed these exercises, albeit early in their POIs, the OBCs programmed exercises with relatively low hours that focused on branch specific training that did not encompass leader-action development.

This research validates the Army Leader and Training Development Panel's conclusions regarding OES training of lieutenants.

A relatively low percentage of lieutenants believe OBC prepared them in terms of technical/tactical requirements, combined arms operations, and applying required doctrine for their initial assignments. Combat support and combat service support lieutenants feel less prepared for combined arms operations than combat arms lieutenants...A low percentage of lieutenants feel the OBC prepared them in those areas having greater relevance to full spectrum operations. Lieutenant skill proficiency is a readily identifiable issue with the field. Only 9% of the respondents provided a positive response (strongly agree/agree) to the question on their perception of company-level competencies for lieutenants. Lieutenants raised a need for more hands-on, performance-oriented training, in leadership and field training exercises in OBC. Instead of hands-on training, large group instruction is the most common method of instruction in OBCs, which tends to stress theoretical concepts over practical leadership skills like dealing with NCOs, and accounting for and maintaining equipment. (ATLDP 2000, 2-90)

Basic Officer Leader Course Comparison

The Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) POI programs more performance-oriented and exercise training than each of the precommissioning sources and OBCs (see Table 18). This POI fills gaps identified in values training and character development, basic soldier skill proficiency, mastery of small-unit tactics and the application of knowledge under duress.

	Instruction	Performance-oriented	Exercises	Total
Values Tasks	26	34	679	739
Technical Tasks	99	722	2194	3014
Tactical Tasks	14	289	626	929
Leader-Actions	202	1145	1280	2627

Table 18. BOLC Task Training.

BOLC provides significant experiential values training through counseling. BOLC's environment affirms the internalization of Army values through feedback from peer interaction and instructor mentorship. BOLC programs a high number of counseling hours that are unmatched by other POIs. The counseling separates into three distinct categories: cadre developmental counseling, performance counseling, and assessment counseling. For cadre developmental counseling, BOLC provides an initial counseling, mid-course counseling, and end of course counseling (USAIS 2002, 1-6). Each counseling session integrates increasingly more data from two self-assessments and two peer evaluations. In culmination, the end of course counseling is a "Developmental Leader Counseling Plan of Action" (FM 22-100 1999, E-2) that accounts for all feedback. In addition to developmental counseling, cadre provides leadership

performance counseling to every small-unit leader in each of his four-programmed leadership positions. Small-unit leaders are an integral part of the performance counseling process, as well. They provide performance counseling to their respective peers in subordinate leadership positions. To complete the circle, cadre provides feedback on peer to peer counseling. This model is termed 360-degree counseling (Fitzgerald 1999, 2). A high density of exercise hours result for this process. A significant end of course feedback mechanism is assessment counseling. Assessment counseling consists of an evaluated target, in this case the small-unit leader, and systemizes questions for feedback regarding the values and attributes of the target. With standardized questions, the target conducts a self-assessment; then all peers within the nine-member squad assess the target; then a noncommissioned officer and officer cadre assess the target. Results from squad averages and platoon averages are utilized as bench marks for self-assessment and evaluation. This process is termed 270-degree assessment and is a significant tool for the internalization of values (USAIS 2002, 12).

For technical task training, BOLC sustains combat proficiency. Results from the evaluation of current task training, the OES fails to sustain combat proficiency in the basic soldier skills needed for protection in combat. BOLC programs extensive performance-oriented technical skills training in all tasks (see Table 7) with the exception of communicate by tactical radio. Of note, the first three weeks of the BOLC POI focus on the instruction and performance-oriented training of technical skills then integrates their application through exercise training. An example, BOLC POI allocates performance-oriented rifle marksmanship training and qualification then integrates an individual movement technique buddy-team live fire exercise that is followed by a stress

shoot. The stress shoot is a marksmanship table under duress that reinforces the need for rifle accuracy while under combat situations (USAIS 2002, 1-6). The sum this rifle training provides a readiness foundation of proficiency as an individual and buddy-team that, critically, serves as the foundation of leader-actions in a small-unit. This same methodology is utilized for land navigation. While BOLC, alone, does not serve as the sole technical task-training course, it does effectively serve as the bridge for technical proficiency from precommissioning to first unit of assignment.

For tactical skill training, the BOLC POI programs a high density of hours in performance-oriented and exercise training. BOLC provides for the mastery of tactical proficiency by doubling, and in most cases, tripling the overall training hours. It is expected for OBCs to organize their exercise training for the mastery of branch specific skills vice tactical skills, however BOLC changes the existing system by providing the small-unit leader the ability to master his tactical skills before he transitions to branch specific training. An example, BOLC conducts three-eight hour days of squad level react to contact drill training, then conducts a 72-hour Squad FTX that continually changes the conditions for the evaluated small-unit leader. For the Squad FTX, the small-unit leader must successfully perform all assigned tactical tasks for each of his two evaluated leadership positions. The difficulty increases, as the small-unit leader enters the subsequent Patrolling FTX, in which the size of tactical units and scope of tactical operations expand. Again, the small-unit leader must successfully perform all assigned tactical tasks for two evaluated leadership positions (USAIS 2002, 1-6; USAIS 2002, 12). BOLC produces small-unit leaders prepared to employ small-units in combat better than the existing system by increasing tactical training hours.

While learning to employ small-units in tactical exercises, the small-unit leader is thrust into the position of influencing and operating small-unit operations. This is critical to the development of leader-actions. The squad and patrolling FTXs, together with the 360-degree counseling model, facilitate experiential learning and the development of leader-actions. BOLC gives small-unit leaders more opportunities to lead small-units, and, more importantly, provides great mechanisms for feedback.

Summary of Interim and Final Conclusions

Doctrine and professional military theory validated the need for training small-unit leaders under the Army Leadership Framework of Be, Know, Do. Army doctrine directs that training to be hard, realistic training that maintains combat proficiency. The initial interim conclusions determined the training that a small-unit leader needs to Be, Know, and Do. The analysis consistently showed the importance on the internalization process of all the Army values and the importance of feedback and assessment from senior leaders. Knowledge focused on warfighting skills comprised of knowing how to use equipment, basic soldier skills, and employment of units in combat. Leader-actions are comprised of planning and preparing, executing learned skills, and assessing, improve and develop their subordinates. The imperative for all training is to be hard, realistic and executed though performance oriented and exercise training.

Analysis of all the POIs answered the final subordinate question regarding how the OES trains Be, Know, Do. Two interim conclusions were derived from the precommissioning sources POI analysis. First, POIs train unequally thereby providing OBCs with officers at varying levels of experience. Second, the POI scheduling does not adhere to the doctrine of sustaining combat proficiency. Three interim conclusions were

derived from the OBC POI analysis. First, only the leadership training is standardized throughout without emphasis on common core skill competencies or sustained leader development. Second, branch schools teach primarily teach branch specific tasks. The performance oriented and exercise training is branch specific and does not adhere to Army training doctrine of multiechelon training. Third, all gaps in task training and sustaining combat proficiency can not be recovered by the OBC POIs.

Comparison of the BOLC POI to the current OES showed that the addition of BOLC to the OES produces better small-unit leaders. The analysis affirms that BOLC fills three essential gaps for the preparation of a small-unit leader. First, its program of experiential values and attributes training is unmatched in all POIs. BOLC validates the internalization process through intensive feedback and assessment. Second, BOLC technical task training sustains combat proficiency. Due to varying POI schedules and academic graduation of lieutenants, BOLC serves as the bridge to OBCs for basic skill proficiency allowing the OBCs to focus on branch specific training. Third, BOLC tactical task training is merged with experiential leader-actions training. This provides small-unit leaders tactical skills not trained at OBCs with the addition of a thorough feedback system.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis shows that the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) improves the Officer Education System (OES) by producing better small-unit leaders. This was done by examining directives of the most recent doctrine, reviewing the expectations of professional military theory, and the analysis of the current programs of instruction (POIs) from the precommissioning sources, Officer Basic Courses (OBCs) and BOLC.

Determining the requirements of a small-unit leader is clearly defined in FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*. Determining the expectations of future combat across the spectrum of conflict is equally well defined by FM 1, *The Army*, and FM 3-0, *Operations*. How the Army should train small-unit leaders in the OES is detailed in great depth in FM 7-0, *Train the Force*. All of these recent doctrinal references characterize the changing of the strategic, operational and tactical environments, thus signifying the need for individual and unit preparedness. In this ever-changing, multidimensional environment, all Army leaders regardless of their branch must be prepared to lead their units in and out of harm's way (Shinseki *Vision* 1999, 7; FM 1 2001, 35). The Army Vision frames the expectations of tomorrow's environment for the small-unit leader.

The world remains a dangerous place full of authoritarian regimes and criminal interests whose combined influence extend the envelope of human suffering by creating haves and have nots. They foster an environment for extremism and the drive to acquire asymmetric capabilities and weapons of mass destruction. They also fuel an irrepressible human demand for freedom and a greater sharing of the better life. The threats to peace and stability are numerous, complex, oftentimes linked, and sometimes aggravated by natural disaster. The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including

conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. (Shinseki, *The Army Vision*, 1999, 4)

This vision signifies the need for leaders of character and competence and assigns this responsibility to the OES for the preparation.

The purpose of the OES is to prepare small-unit leaders with the necessary skills, knowledge, and attributes required when leading soldiers in combat. The Deputy Commanding General for Combined Arms, Lieutenant General James Riley, directed the End State for schoolhouse in his FY03 Curriculum Guidance.

My desired end state for our institutions is training and education curricula that produce competent, confident, self-aware, and adaptive leaders and soldiers with COE-relevant skills, knowledge, and attributes (SKAs) in addition to those direct-, organizational-, and strategic-leader SKAs delineated in FM 22-100 (FM 6-22 in the future), *Army Leadership*. (Lieutenant General James Riley, 2002, 2)

As stated in chapter 4, the analysis affirms that BOLC provides three critical components in the development of a small-unit leader. First, its program of experiential values and attributes training facilitates the internalization process through intensive feedback and assessment. The only comparison to the success of this program is the United States Military Academy's (USMA) structured feedback system. Second, BOLC sustains combat proficiency. The most current and up-to-date Army equipment is provided for performance oriented training. While the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) is limited to the equipment provided by local Army installations to include National Guard and Reserves, most leaders progress through OES to their first unit of assignment never touching the many pieces in the Army's inventory. Third, BOLC provides more opportunities for experiential leader-actions training.

In addition, the BOLC POI provides supplementary training advantages. BOLC programs' training that emphasizes mastery of fears. The fear of height, water, darkness,

physical contact, and failure are significant to the internalization process of character development (USAIS 2002, 1; FM 7-0 2002, 1-1; FM 22-100 1999, 2-86). COL Dandridge Malone USA (Retired), *Small-unit Leadership*, indicates the importance of preparing for stress.

Leading soldiers during battle is probably the toughest challenge anyone can face. The danger, fear, lack of sleep, and constant tension all put enormous strains on bodies and minds. Battle involves high stress. Effective performance under such high stress conditions requires preparation before men meet those conditions. (Malone, 1983, 147)

This training consists of live-fire maneuvers, land and water obstacle courses, night infiltration course, combatives (also known as ground fighting techniques), and extensive physical training (USAIS, BOLC POI 2002, 1-6). Notwithstanding is this process is the fear of failure. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, indicates achieving military competence distinguishes the officer above all else. Not meeting requisites or standards results in a failure of attaining accreditation of officership into the profession. BOLC places emphasis, arguably the most emphasis, in the practice of feedback and assessment. While advisor to subordinate and peer feedback systems are not uncommon to the OES, the innovative 360 degree counseling system and 270 degree leader evaluation provide a unique capability of a legacy of self-development and the tools to export counseling through their professions.

Recommendations

The current OES was designed under the Cold War and needs remodeling. As indicated in chapter 2, major organizational and POI revisions have not been adopted since the Review of Education and Training of Officers, Professional Development of Officers, and the Leadership Development Studies. Yet, how the Army fights, how the

Army Trains and who the Army could fight has all changed. Even in the impetus of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), its first commander, General DePuy endeavored “to shake up the Army organizationally and intellectually” (Chapman et al. 1997, 1). With the emplacement of BOLC between the precommissioning source and the OBCs, small-unit leaders are better prepared to assume a leader position in their first assignment by a cognitive building process that begins broad in scope and narrows to branch specialty.

Where to Train and Why

Though there are many types of training that challenge leadership, resources factor in the effectiveness of execution. While infantry-centric training is the vehicle by which small-unit leaders are trained, there is equal argument given to the leadership challenges of building a Bailey Bridge vice that of conducting a small-unit patrol. Nevertheless, the simplicity of resourcing small-unit tactical training and establishing an effective rotation of feedback and assessment are unmatched by other methods. Dense wooded training areas enable the BOLC POI to provide an effective throughput of small-unit leaders. Simply put, trainers can walk out 100 meters to the back forty and observe a leadership laboratory.

Retain, Retrain, and or Remove

Now, that the BOLC concept is approved for adoption to the OES, it is an imperative that its current program of instruction remains intact (Triggs 2003, 1). More importantly, measures should be implemented for those who do not meet the requirements. In this smaller Army, BOLC should serve as mechanism that measures leadership effectiveness by retaining, retraining, and or removing an officer from future

service. Though the implications of such consequences are high, there stands no objective means of judicious measure of a small-unit leader's character and competence before he reports to his first unit of assignment.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS II

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 31 January 1991

MILITARY QUALIFICATION STANDARDS II MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vi
CHAPTER 1 - THE MQS SYSTEM	1-1
MQS and Leader Development	1-1
MQS Philosophy	1-3
Summary	1-3
CHAPTER 2 - MQS II OVERVIEW	2-0
Introduction	2-0
Your Responsibilities in MQS II	2-0
MQS II Military Task and Knowledge Component	2-1
MQS II Professional Military Education Component	2-3
CHAPTER 3 - LIEUTENANTS	3-1
AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE	
S3-9011.01-0002 Describe the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine	3-1
S3-8961.00-0001 Describe Rear Operations Doctrine	3-2
LEADERSHIP	
03-9001.10-0003 Apply the Ethical Decision-Making Process	3-4
03-9001.12-0002 Communicate Effectively	3-4
03-9001.14-0002 Motivate Subordinates to Accomplish Unit Missions	3-5
03-9001.15-0002 Conduct Subordinate Counseling	3-5
03-9001.16-0002 Develop Subordinate Leaders in a Platoon or Equivalent Sized Organization	3-6
01-9001.17-0002 Develop a Cohesive Platoon Sized Organization	3-7
01-9001.19-0001 Take Charge of a Platoon or Equivalent Organization	3-8
03-9080.10-1001 Administer Military Justice at Platoon or Section Level	3-9
03-9003.02-0001 Manage Accident Risk in Unit Operations	3-12

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*This publication supersedes STP 21-11-MQS, 25 March 1987.

S3-9001.00-0012	Relate Army Leadership Doctrine to Your Service as an Officer	3-14
S3-9001.00-0014	Identify the Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Noncommissioned Officers	3-16
S1-9001.10-0002	Explain the Professional Army Ethic	3-18
S3-9001.16-0001	Manage Organizational Stress	3-19
S3-9060.00-1000	Conduct Small Unit Combat Operations According to the Law of War	3-21
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS		
INTELLIGENCE		
03-3711.13-0001	Process Captured Materiel	3-25
S3-8987.01-0001	Describe the Categories of Threat	3-26
04-8955.00-0001	Recognize Friendly and Threat Armored Vehicles and Aircraft (878-920-1002)	#
MANEUVER		
01-7200.75-0100	Conduct Convoy Operations	3-28
04-3301.02-0012	Defend a Platoon Position	3-29
04-3303.02-0040	Navigate with a Compass and Map	3-31
04-3303.02-0037	Navigate While Mounted	3-33
04-3303.02-0039	Plan and Execute a Route	3-34
FIRE SUPPORT		
AIR DEFENSE		
01-0401.20-0001	Direct Unit Air Defense	3-36
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY		
01-1940.00-1001	Supervise Construction of Obstacles	3-38
03-3711.12-0001	Implement Operations Security	3-40
03-8952.00-9050	Employ Directed Energy and Laser Protective Measures	3-41
04-5030.00-2008	Prepare and Submit Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical 1 Report	3-42
04-5030.00-2013	Implement Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Based on Threat or Direction	3-43
04-5030.00-2017	Prepare for Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Attack	3-44
04-5030.00-2007	Supervise Unit Response to Nuclear Attack or Radiological Hazard	3-46
04-5030.00-2018	Check Soldiers Sleeping in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 4	3-46
04-5030.00-2015	Supervise Radiation Monitoring	3-47
04-5030.00-2006	Supervise Unit Response to a Chemical or Biological Attack	3-49
04-5030.00-2019	Control Unit Radiation Exposure	3-50
04-5030.00-2020	Supervise Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Decontamination	3-51
04-5030.00-2021	Conduct Unmasking Procedures	3-53
04-5030.00-2022	Supervise Employment of Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Markers	3-55
01-5700.02-0001	Enforce Platoon and Company Communications Security Measures	3-56
01-5767.02-0001	Conduct Electronic Counter-Counter Measures	3-58
04-5770.02-0002	Operate Communications Security Equipment VINSON	3-59
03-3711.12-0002	Protect Classified Information and Material	3-60
S4-5030.00-2024	Describe Mitigation Techniques for Nuclear Weapons Effects	3-63
S3-9014.02-0010	Describe the Army's Combating Terrorism Program for Deployable Units	3-66
04-5030.00-2009	Use the Latrine While in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 4 (031-503-1009)	#
04-5030.00-2010	Use M8 Detector Paper to Identify Chemical Agents (031-503-1014)	#

See STP 21-1-SMCT for this task.

04-5030.00-2011	Use M9 Detector Paper to Identify Chemical Agents (031-503-1020)	#
03-5030.00-2023	Drink from a Canteen While in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 4 (031-503-1009)	#
04-5030.00-2012	Supervise Fitting of Protective Mask (031-503-1020)	##
04-5030.00-2014	Use M256 or M256A Chemical Detection Kit (031-503-3001)	##
04-5030.00-2016	Exchange Mission Oriented Protective Posture Gear (031-503-1023)	#

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

04-8310.00-1016	Request Army Aeromedical Evacuation (081-831-0101)	##
03-3751.01-0101	Supervise Processing of Captives at Unit Level	3-67
01-4965.90-0001	Supervise Unit Maintenance Operations	3-68
03-4976.90-0501	Prepare a Materiel Condition Status Report	3-69
03-4985.90-0010	Direct Vehicle and Equipment Recovery Operations	3-69
03-5101.00-0283	Supervise the Maintenance of Unit Proscribed Load List	3-70
04-4966.90-0010	Supervise Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services	3-70
03-5101.00-0281	Direct the Preparation and Maintenance of Unit Supply Records	3-71
03-5101.00-0282	Direct the Storage of Unit Supplies, Weapons, Equipment, and Ammunition	3-72
03-8310.00-9000	Supervise Unit Preventive Medicine and Field Sanitation Procedures	3-72
03-5104.00-0007	Supervise Graves Registration Support	3-74
03-5101.00-0006	Conduct a Report of Survey	3-75
03-0150.00-1008	Initiate a Recommendation for an Award	3-76
04-3304.02-0003	Operate a Small Arms Range	3-77
S1-4960.90-0001	Discuss Army Maintenance Systems	3-78
S3-0170.00-1006	Describe the Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Systems	3-80

COMMAND AND CONTROL

03-9001.13-0001	Solve Problems Using the Military Problem Solving Process	3-81
01-5703.02-0001	Construct Field Expedient Antennas	3-82
01-5711.02-0001	Install Hot Loop with Telephone TA-312/PT	3-84
01-5831.02-0003	Read a Message	3-84
04-3303.02-0014	Prepare Platoon or Company Combat Orders	3-85

TRAINING

04-3303.02-0018	Develop Unit Small Arms Marksmanship Training Program	3-87
03-0001.00-0027	Develop a Platoon or Section Physical Fitness Program	3-89
03-4651.90-0001	Supervise Training and Licensing of Unit Equipment Operators	3-90
04-8951.00-8951	Explain the Army's Training Philosophy	3-91
03-8951.00-8952	Apply the Battle Focus Process at Platoon Level to Select Tasks and Develop Training Objectives	3-93
01-8951.00-8953	Plan Battle Focused Training at Platoon Level	3-94
03-8951.00-8954	Conduct Platoon Training	3-95
01-8951.00-8955	Apply Assessment and Feedback in the Platoon Battle Focused Training Process	3-96

HISTORY

S3-9017.00-0005	Discuss the Role and Use of Military History in the Professional Development of Officers	3-97
S3-9017.03-0004	Explain the Battle Analysis Methodology	3-98

See STP 21-1-SMCT for this task.

See STP 21-24-SMCT for this task.

SOLDIER AND UNIT SUPPORT SYSTEM

01-9007.01-0250 Brief to Inform, Persuade, or Direct	3-100
01-9007.01-0220 Write to Inform or Direct	3-101
S3-0320.00-0011 Describe Elements of Army Family Programs	3-102
S3-0170.01-1014 Describe the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program	3-103
S3-0010.00-0014 Implement Equal Opportunity at Unit Level	3-104

APPENDIX B

PRECOMMISSIONING COMMON CORE

TASK TITLE	TASK #
1. Act in accordance with the provisions of the code of conduct (SPECIAL FORCES/JFK)	<u>331-919-0146</u>
2. Adjust indirect fire (FA)	<u>061-283-6003</u>
3. Analyze terrain (INFANTRY)	<u>071-331-0820</u>
4. Apply customs, courtesies and traditions of the service (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1181</u>
5. Apply leadership fundamentals to create a climate that fosters ethical behavior (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1135</u>
6. Apply team development techniques to enhance unit performance (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1170</u>
7. Apply the characteristics and components of a profession to military service as an officer (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1111</u>
8. Apply the essential elements of Army leadership doctrine to a given situation (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1110</u>
9. Apply the just war tradition to your service as a leader and the profession of arms (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1131</u>
10. Apply the principles of war during mission planning (TRADOC-ATMH)	<u>155-197-0010</u>
11. Apply US Army branch information to career decisions (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1182</u>
12. Communicate by a tactical radio (SIGNAL)	<u>113-305-1001</u>
13. Communicate by a tactical telephone (SIGNAL)	<u>113-311-1001</u>
14. Communicate effectively in a given situation (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1140</u>
15. Comply with DOD joint ethics regulatory (JER) requirements (JAG)	<u>181-231-1001</u>
16. Comply with the host nation, federal, state and local environmental laws and regulations (ENGINEER)	<u>051-250-1001</u>
17. Conduct a defense by a squad sized unit (INFANTRY)	<u>071-430-0002</u>
18. Conduct a military briefing (CGSC)	<u>158-300-0020</u>
19. Conduct a risk assessment (TRADOC-ATBO-SO)	<u>154-385-6263</u>
20. Conduct drill and ceremonies (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0006</u>
21. Conduct movement techniques by a squad (INFANTRY)	<u>071-326-5610</u>
22. Conduct pre-combat checks (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0004</u>
23. Conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (CASCOM)	<u>091-257-0002</u>
24. Conduct small-unit combat operations according to the law of war (JAG)	<u>181-431-1001</u>
25. Control entry into a restricted area (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0003</u>
26. Coordinate activities with staffs (CGSC)	<u>158-200-1000</u>
27. Counsel subordinates (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1260</u>
28. Decontaminate yourself and individual equipment using chemical decontamination kits (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1013</u>
29. Detect chemical agents using M8 or M9 detector paper (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1037</u>
30. Employ an M18A1 claymore (INFANTRY)	<u>071-325-4425</u>
31. Employ hand grenades (INFANTRY)	<u>071-325-4407</u>
32. Employ military justice (JAG)	<u>181-331-1001</u>
33. Employ physical security measures (MP)	<u>191-000-0002</u>
34. Enforce compliance with the Army's equal opportunity and sexual harassment policies (AG)	<u>121-050-8010</u>
35. Enforce detection prevention measures (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0005</u>
36. Evaluate a casualty (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1000</u>
37. Identify duties, responsibilities and authority of officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and civilians (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1183</u>
38. Identify intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets (MI)	<u>301-371-1150</u>
39. Identify joint force structures, capabilities, and operations	<u>158-250-1000</u>
40. Identify the legal implications of the homosexual conduct policy (JAG)	<u>181-301-0001</u>
41. Identify the roles and organization of the US Army (CGSC)	<u>158-250-0001</u>
42. Identify ways national, Army and individual values and professional obligations relate to each other (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1132</u>
43. Implement an individual total fitness program (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0009</u>
44. Implement basic measures to reduce your vulnerabilities to terrorist acts/attack (MP)	<u>191-000-0005</u>
45. Implement operational security measures (MI)	<u>301-371-1050</u>
46. Implement preventive medicine measures (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-9000</u>
47. Integrate the basic knowledge of military history into your education as a future officer (TRADOC-ATMH)	<u>155-197-0020</u>
48. Integrate threat capabilities into mission planning (TRADOC-ATIN-O)	<u>153-200-2020</u>
49. Issue an oral operations order (INFANTRY)	<u>071-326-5505</u>
50. Maintain an M16A1/M16A2 rifle (INFANTRY)	<u>071-311-2025</u>
51. Maintain an M60 machine gun (INFANTRY)	<u>071-312-3025</u>
52. Maintain your assigned protective mask (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1036</u>
53. Motivate subordinates to improve performance (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1150</u>
54. Navigate from one point on the ground to another point while dismounted (INFANTRY)	<u>071-329-1006</u>
55. Operate an M16A1/M16A2 rifle (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0002</u>
56. Operate an M60 machine gun (INFANTRY)	<u>071-990-0001</u>
57. Perform first aid for a suspected fracture (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1034</u>

58. Perform first aid for an open abdominal wound (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1025</u>
59. Perform first aid for an open chest wound (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1026</u>
60. Perform first aid for an open head wound (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1033</u>
61. Perform first aid for bleeding of an extremity (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1032</u>
62. Perform first aid for burns (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1007</u>
63. Perform first aid for cold injuries (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1045</u>
64. Perform first aid for heat injuries (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1008</u>
65. Perform first aid for nerve agent injury (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1044</u>
66. Perform first aid to clear an object stuck in the throat of a conscious casualty (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1003</u>
67. Perform first aid to prevent or control shock (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1005</u>
68. Perform mouth to mouth resuscitation (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1042</u>
69. Prepare a range card for an M60 machine gun (INFANTRY)	<u>071-312-3007</u>
70. Process captives (MP)	<u>191-000-0001</u>
71. Process captured materiel (MI)	<u>301-371-1200</u>
72. Protect classified information and material (MI)	<u>301-371-1052</u>
73. Protect yourself from chemical/biological contamination using your assigned protective mask (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1035</u>
74. Protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination with the appropriate mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1015</u>
75. React to a chemical or biological hazard or attack (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1019</u>
76. React to direct and indirect fire (INFANTRY)	<u>071-326-0510</u>
77. React to nuclear hazard or attack (CHEM)	<u>031-503-1018</u>
78. Recommend administrative and personnel actions (AG)	<u>121-010-8015</u>
79. Report casualties (AG)	<u>121-010-8001</u>
80. Report intelligence information (MI)	<u>301-371-1000</u>
81. Request medical evacuation (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-0101</u>
82. Resolve an ethical problem (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1134</u>
83. Respond to depleted uranium (CM)	<u>031-503-1017</u>
84. Supervise supply activities (QM/CASCOM)	<u>101-92Y-0001</u>
85. Supervise the implementation of financial readiness actions (FINANCE)	<u>121-008-1496</u>
86. Train a squad (TRADOC-ATTG-CD)	<u>152-020-0010</u>
87. Train a team (TRADOC-ATTG-CD)	<u>152-020-0007</u>
88. Train subordinates to perform an individual task (TRADOC-ATTG-CD)	<u>152-010-0005</u>
89. Transport a casualty (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1046</u>
90. Write in the Army style (CGSC)	<u>158-300-0010</u>

APPENDIX C

OFFICER BASIC COMMON CORE

TASK TITLE	TASK #
1. Apply the Army's operational doctrine to mission planning (CGSC)	<u>158-200-2000</u>
2. Apply the ethical decision making process at small-unit level (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1230</u>
3. Brief to inform, persuade or direct (CGSC)	<u>158-300-0030</u>
4. Commercial Life Insurance Sales Procedures (SSI)	<u>NA</u>
5. Communicate effectively as a leader (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1240</u>
6. Comply with DOD joint ethics regulatory (JER) requirements (JAG)	<u>181-231-1001</u>
7. Conduct a defense by a platoon (INFANTRY)	<u>071-430-0006</u>
8. Conduct small-unit combat operations according to the law of war (JAG)	<u>181-431-1001</u>
9. Conduct unmasking procedures (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3002</u>
10. Coordinate unit deployment readiness activities (AG)	<u>121-010-3095</u>
11. Counsel subordinates (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1260</u>
12. Develop a cohesive platoon sized organization (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1272</u>
13. Develop subordinate leaders in a platoon (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1271</u>
14. Employ military justice (JAG)	<u>181-331-1001</u>
15. Employ the risk management process during mission planning (TRADOC-ATBO-SO)	<u>154-385-6465</u>
16. Identify chemical agents using M256 series chemical agent detector kits (CHEM)	<u>031-503-2001</u>
17. Identify duties, responsibilities and authority of warrant officers at the platoon level (WOCC)	<u>020-220-0001</u>
18. Identify joint doctrine and capabilities pertinent to operations and training missions for small-unit leaders and staff officers assigned to a Joint Task Force (JTF) (CGSC)	<u>158-250-2000</u>
19. Identify the legal implications of the homosexual conduct policy (JAG)	<u>181-301-0001</u>
20. Identify your leader responsibilities/actions that support stewardship for resources (AMSC)	<u>704-001-0001</u>
21. Implement measures to reduce combat stress (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1285</u>
22. Implement measures to reduce your unit's personnel and equipment vulnerabilities to terrorist acts/attack (MP)	<u>191-000-0006</u>
23. Implement mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3008</u>
24. Implement operational security measures (MI)	<u>301-371-1050</u>
25. Implement suicide prevention measures (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-9018</u>
26. Implement the Army's equal opportunity and sexual harassment policies in a platoon (AG)	<u>121-050-8031</u>
27. Integrate historical awareness and critical thinking skills derived from military history methodologies into the training and education of self and subordinate leaders (TRADOC-ATMH)	<u>155-297-0010</u>
28. Integrate threat capabilities into mission planning (TRADOC-ATIN-O)	<u>153-200-2020</u>
29. Issue an oral operations order (INFANTRY)	<u>071-326-5505</u>
30. Lead a convoy serial/march unit (TRANSPORTATION/CASCOM)	<u>551-88M-0001</u>
31. Measure radiation dose rate and total dose (CHEM)	<u>031-503-2023</u>
32. Motivate subordinates to accomplish unit missions (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1250</u>
33. Navigate from one point on the ground to another point while dismounted (INFANTRY)	<u>071-329-1006</u>
34. Participate in a media interview (PAPA)	<u>224-300-1000</u>
35. Plan unit movement (TRANSPORTATION/CASCOM)	<u>551-88N-0003</u>
36. Prepare a unit for NBC attack (CHEM)	<u>031-503-4002</u>
37. Prepare for unit movement (TRANSPORTATION/CASCOM)	<u>551-88N-0002</u>
38. Process captured materiel (MI)	<u>301-371-1200</u>
39. Protect classified information and material (MI)	<u>301-371-1052</u>
40. Protect yourself and others from NBC injury/contamination by using a collective protection shelter (CHEM)	<u>031-506-1052</u>
41. React to unexploded ordnance hazards (ORDNANCE/CASCOM)	<u>093-401-5040</u>
42. Recommend administrative and personnel actions (AG)	<u>121-010-8015</u>
43. Solve problems using the military problem solving process (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1281</u>
44. Submit NBC 1 Report (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3005</u>
45. Supervise combat service support functions during platoon operations (QM/CASCOM)	<u>151-357-0001</u>
46. Supervise crossing of a contaminated area (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3004</u>
47. Supervise decontamination procedures (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3014</u>
48. Supervise employment of nuclear, biological and chemical markers (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3010</u>
49. Supervise mortuary support functions (QM/CASCOM)	<u>101-515-0001</u>
50. Supervise platoon compliance with the host nation, federal, state and local environmental law and regulations (ENGINEER)	<u>051-250-1002</u>
51. Supervise preventive maintenance checks and services (ORDNANCE/CASCOM)	<u>091-357-0001</u>
52. Supervise radiation monitoring procedures (CHEM)	<u>031-503-3006</u>
53. Supervise supply activities in a unit (QM/CASCOM)	<u>101-92Y-0002</u>
54. Supervise the implementation of air defense measures (AD)	<u>441-401-0001</u>
55. Supervise the implementation of Army Family Team Building Program (AG)	<u>121-040-8021</u>

56. Supervise the implementation of financial readiness actions (FINANCE)	<u>121-008-1496</u>
57. Supervise the implementation of platoon electronic protection measures (SIGNAL)	<u>113-367-9001</u>
58. Supervise the implementation of preventive medicine policies (AMEDD)	<u>081-831-1047</u>
59. Supervise unit maintenance operations (ORDNANCE/CASCOM)	<u>091-670-0003</u>
60. Take charge of a platoon (CGSC)	<u>158-100-1282</u>
61. Train a platoon (TRADOC-ATTG-CD)	<u>152-020-0030</u>
62. Write to inform or direct (CGSC)	<u>158-300-0040</u>

APPENDIX D

TC 440 SKILLS MATRIX

TACTICAL: Application

X = Primary Relationship
O = Secondary Relationship

		MANAGEMENT										COMMO	PROBLEM SOLVING	TACTICAL	TECHNICAL	
		Planning	Execution & Control	Identifying Structure	Interaction w/ Sub & Superior	Pursuit & Receipt of Info	IO & Interpretation of Info	Weighting Alternatives	Choose & Execute Action	Application	Vehicles				Eqpt	Basic
MINIMIZE PROBABILITY OF BEING DETECTED	Instructing subordinates to maintain noise and light discipline.	O	O	O	O					X						
	Maintaining minimal radio traffic (radio discipline).	O	O	O	O					X	O					
	Moving during inclement weather.									X						
	Instructing subordinates to camouflage weapons, equipment, vehicles, positions, and themselves.									X						
	Instructing subordinate leaders to use routes of movement (and method of movement) to minimize exposure.	O								X						
	Instructing subordinates in methods for exercising caution when moving.	O	O							X						
ENHANCE PROBABILITY OF DETECTING ENEMY FORCE	Includes several OPs, IPs, patrols and ambushes as far forward as possible to provide adequate early warning and maximum number of engagement opportunities.					O				X						
	Includes a point element (or RECON when moving) as far forward as possible.					O				X						
	Disperse overwatch elements to maximize observation and engagement opportunities.					O				X						
	Booby traps, mines, probable avenues of approach not covered by personnel.					O				X						
DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY	Identify enemy's weakest point by employing probing action.					O	O			X						
	Engage attacking force as many times as possible before becoming decisively engaged.									X						
	Engages enemy at unexpected times and places (e.g., attacking enemy's rear).									X						
	Maintains reserves to meet unforeseen disposition of enemy.									X						

X = Primary Relationship
O = Secondary Relationship

PL 1

		TECHNICAL-EQUIPMENT: Weapons										EQUIPMENT	
		MANAGEMENT					COMMO	PROBLEM SOLVING	TACTICAL			Eqpt	Basic
		Planning	Location & Control	Initiation Structure	Interaction w/ Sub & Superiors	Pursuit & Devs of Info	ID & Interpretation of Info	Weighting Alternatives	Choose & Execute Action	Vehicles	Communication Equipment	Weapons	Tactics & Adjusts
												Typ Reading	
WEAPONS	Inspects weapons prior to initiation mission										X		
	Places weapons so they take best advantage of maximum effective range							O			X		
	Positions weapons where they are most likely to engage appropriate targets (e.g., matches targets to weapons).					O		O			X		
	Positions weapons to have overlapping fields of fire							O			X		
	Positions weapons to compensate for limitations of other weapons (e.g., putting anti-tank mines on a probable avenue approach that can't be covered by deployed primary weapons).							O			X		
	Uses appropriate fuses and amounts (VT on troops in the open, DE on armored vehicles, PD on reinforced positions).										X		
	Uses pre-planned fires on anticipated enemy location.					O		O			X		
	Uses registration points to ensure security and to ensure artillery requests.									O	X		
	Request marking rounds prior to FFIT to ensure proper placement and maximum effective use of artillery										X		

TECHNICAL-EQUIPMENT: Weapons

X = Primary Relationship

O = Secondary Relationship

TECHNICAL-BASIC: Terrain Analysis

X - Primary Relationship
O - Secondary Relationship

TERRAIN ANALYSIS		MANAGEMENT	COMMO	PROBLEM SOLVING	TACTICAL	TECHNICAL	
						Eqpt	Basic
TERRAIN ANALYSIS	Identifies probable enemy position depending on topography.			O			X
	Accurately identifies possible enemy avenues of advance.			O			X
	Uses terrain to conceal routes of advance.				O		X
		Planning					
		Execution & Control					
		Initiating Structure					
		Interaction w/ Sub & Superior					
		Transfer of Information					
		Pursuit & Receipt of Info					
		ID & Interpretation of Info					
		Weighting Alternatives					
		Choosing & Ensuring Action					
		Application					
		Vehicles					
		Communication Equipment					
		Weapons					
		Terrain Analysis					
		Map Reading					

TECHNICAL-BASIC: Map Reading

X = Primary Relationship
O = Secondary Relationship

		MANAGEMENT	COMMO	PROBLEM SOLVING	TACTICAL	TECHNICAL									
						Eqpt	Basic								
TECHNICAL-BASIC: Map Reading		Planning	Execution & Control	Initiating Structure	Interception w/Sub & Superiors	Pursuit & Receipt of Info	IC & Interpretation of Info	Warning Alternatives	Choice & Evasive Action	Application	Vehicles	Communication Equipment	Weapons	Terrain Analysis	Map Reading
X = Primary Relationship O = Secondary Relationship															
MAP READING	Accurately follows planned avenues of advance.													X	
	Contains all action (movement and fire) within specified AO.													X	
	Accurately identifies coordinates of enemy positions.													X	
	Occupies correct positions as identified on map.													X	

ANNEX E

SKILLS AND ACTIONS

SUGGESTED TASK	REFERENCES			
	FM 3.0	MQS	Common Core	TC 440
PLANNING				
Develop a Plan	X	X	X	X
Issue an oral operations order	X		X	X
Conduct a military briefing			X	
Plan unit movement	X		X	X
Train a Unit	X	X	X	
Integrate threat capabilities into mission planning	X		X	X
Employ the risk management process during mission planning		X	X	
MANEUVER				
Conduct small-unit movement techniques	X	X	X	
Conduct small-unit combat operations according to the law of war	X	X	X	
Navigate from one point on the ground to another point while dismounted/mounted	X	X	X	X
Lead a convoy serial/march unit	X	X	X	X
React to Contact (Dismounted)	X		X	X
React to Contact (Mounted)	X		X	X
Defend a position	X	X	X	
Communicate by a tactical radio		X	X	X
Analyze terrain	X	X	X	X
FIREPOWER				
Employ hand grenades	X		X	X
Prepare a range card for an M60 machine gun	X		X	X
Adjust indirect fire	X		X	X
Operate an M16/M4 Rifle	X		X	X
Operate an M60/M240 MG	X		X	X
PROTECTION				
Employ physical security measures	X	X	X	
Decontaminate yourself and individual equipment using chemical decontamination kits		X	X	
Detect chemical agents using M8 or M9 detector paper		X	X	
Enforce detection prevention measures	X	X	X	X
Implement basic measures to reduce your vulnerabilities to terrorist acts/attack	X	X	X	
Implement operational security measures	X	X	X	X

Implement preventive medicine measures	X	X	X	X
Protect yourself from contamination using your protective mask		X	X	
Protect yourself from contamination		X	X	
React to a chemical or biological hazard/attack		X	X	
React to direct and indirect fire			X	X
React to nuclear hazard or attack		X	X	
INFORMATION OPERATIONS				
Process captives	X	X	X	
Process captured materiel	X	X	X	
Report intelligence information	X		X	X
Recon a route		X		X
Map Recon		X	X	X
LEADERSHIP				
Apply leadership fundamentals to create a climate that fosters ethical behavior	X	X	X	
Counsel subordinates	X	X	X	
Implement an small-unit total fitness program			X	
Motivate subordinates to improve performance	X	X	X	X
Train subordinates to perform an individual task			X	X
Develop a cohesive organization	X	X	X	X
Develop subordinate leaders	X	X	X	X
Supervise CSS functions during operations		X	X	
Supervise the implementation of Army Family Team Building Program			X	
Take charge of a unit	X	X	X	X
Supervise preventive maintenance checks and services		X	X	X
Supervise the implementation of air defense measures		X	X	X
Supervise the implementation of preventive medicine policies	X	X	X	X
Conduct pre-combat checks	X		X	X
Employ Field Discipline	X			X
SAFETY				
Perform first aid	X		X	
Conduct preventive maintenance checks and services	X		X	X
Evaluate a casualty	X		X	X
Maintain an M16/M4 rifle	X	X	X	X
Maintain an M60/M240 machine gun	X	X	X	X
Maintain your assigned protective mask	X	X	X	X
Supervise unit maintenance operations	X	X	X	X
Request medical evacuation			X	X

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